On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 04:36:36PM +0000, David Laight wrote:
From: Al Viro
quoted
Sent: 14 April 2015 17:34
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 04:21:02PM +0000, David Laight wrote:
quoted
Massive NAK.
This breaks any code that is using msg_control to set SCTP parameters
when sending data.
Huh? ->sendmsg() expects ->msg_control already in kernel space;
it's ->recvmsg() that plays silly buggers with userland pointers there.
I read your commit message as implying that you hadn't found any
users of kernel_sendmsg() that used msg_control.
Not that the data was always read from kernel space.
Sigh... The situation is:
* ->sendmsg() expects ->msg_control copied to userland. sendmsg(2),
sendto(2), etc. do that copying. See ___sys_sendmsg() - there we have
/*
* Careful! Before this, msg_sys->msg_control contains a user pointer.
* Afterwards, it will be a kernel pointer. Thus the compiler-assisted
* checking falls down on this.
*/
if (copy_from_user(ctl_buf,
(void __user __force *)msg_sys->msg_control,
ctl_len))
goto out_freectl;
msg_sys->msg_control = ctl_buf;
As the result, ->sendmsg() instances access ->msg_control contents as normal
kernel data.
* ->recvmsg() expects ->msg_control to point to userland. See
net/core/scm.c for the helpers used to store into it. recvmsg(2) et.al.
simply leave the userland pointer there; worse, that pointer might be
to native or to compat variants, and layouts _are_ different. Thus those
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & msg->msg_flags) in net/core/scm.c...
* kernel-side users of ->sendmsg() do not depend on setfs() for
access to their ->msg_control, simply because ->sendmsg() won't be using
copy_from_user()/get_user() to access it anyway.
* kernel-side users of ->recvmsg() are less lucky - most of them
don't give a damn either (they have NULL ->msg_control), but there's an
exception (somewhere in sunrpc, IIRC). So there we need to keep
playing with setfs(), even though the data side would be just fine without
that.