On Tue, May 19, 2026 at 01:41:42PM +0000, Mostafa Saleh wrote:
On Tue, May 19, 2026 at 10:29:11AM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
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On Tue, May 19, 2026 at 11:04:37AM +0000, Mostafa Saleh wrote:
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On Thu, May 14, 2026 at 08:13:25PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:
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What I meant was that we need a generic way to identify a pKVM guest, so
that we can use it in the conditional above.
I have this patch, with that I can boot with your series unmodified,
but I will need to do more testing.
Thanks, I can add this to the series once you complete the required testing.
I am still running more tests, but looking more into it. Setting
force_dma_unencrypted() to true for pKVM guests is wrong, as the
guest shouldn’t try to decrypt arbitrary memory as it can include
sensitive information (for example in case of virtio sub-page
allocation) and should strictly rely on the restricted-dma-pool
for that.
??
Where does force_dma_unencrypted() cause arbitary memory passed into
the DMA API to be decrypted? That should never happen???
Sorry, maybe arbitrary is not the right expression again :)
I mean that, with emulated devices that use the DMA-API under pKVM,
they will map memory coming from other layers (VFS, net) through
vitrio-block, virtio-net... These can be smaller than a page, and
using force_dma_unencrypted() will share the whole page.
force_dma_unencrypted() should only trigger swiotlb and that never
memcpy's more than necessary?
Where does it do otherwise? That sounds like a bug?
Jason