Re: [PATCH v4 04/13] dma: swiotlb: track pool encryption state and honor DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED

On Tue, May 19, 2026 at 10:29:11AM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:

On Tue, May 19, 2026 at 11:04:37AM +0000, Mostafa Saleh wrote:

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On Thu, May 14, 2026 at 08:13:25PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:

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What I meant was that we need a generic way to identify a pKVM guest, so
that we can use it in the conditional above.

I have this patch, with that I can boot with your series unmodified,
but I will need to do more testing.

Thanks, I can add this to the series once you complete the required testing.

I am still running more tests, but looking more into it. Setting
force_dma_unencrypted() to true for pKVM guests is wrong, as the
guest shouldn’t try to decrypt arbitrary memory as it can include
sensitive information (for example in case of virtio sub-page
allocation) and should strictly rely on the restricted-dma-pool
for that.

??

Where does force_dma_unencrypted() cause arbitary memory passed into
the DMA API to be decrypted? That should never happen???

Sorry, maybe arbitrary is not the right expression again :)
I mean that, with emulated devices that use the DMA-API under pKVM,
they will map memory coming from other layers (VFS, net) through
vitrio-block, virtio-net... These can be smaller than a page, and
using force_dma_unencrypted() will share the whole page.
And as discussed, that leaks sensitive information to the untrusted
host.
I am currently investigating passing iova/phys/size
to force_dma_unencrypted() and then we can share pages inplace only
if possible without leaking extra information.
I am trying to get some performance results first. But the tricky part
is to get the semantics right, I believe in that case those devices
shouldn’t use restricted-dma-pools as those should always force
bouncing. Instead bouncing happens through the default SWIOTLB pool,
if not possible to decrypt in place.

Thanks,
Mostafa

Jason