On Fri, May 9, 2025 at 11:39 AM [off-list ref] wrote:

Hello:

This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master)
by Alexei Starovoitov [off-list ref]:

On Thu,  1 May 2025 09:35:51 +0200 you wrote:

quoted

This improves the expressiveness of unprivileged BPF by inserting
speculation barriers instead of rejecting the programs.

The approach was previously presented at LPC'24 [1] and RAID'24 [2].

To mitigate the Spectre v1 (PHT) vulnerability, the kernel rejects
potentially-dangerous unprivileged BPF programs as of
commit 9183671af6db ("bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted
branches"). In [2], we have analyzed 364 object files from open source
projects (Linux Samples and Selftests, BCC, Loxilb, Cilium, libbpf
Examples, Parca, and Prevail) and found that this affects 31% to 54% of
programs.

[...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [bpf-next,v3,01/11] selftests/bpf: Fix caps for __xlated/jited_unpriv
    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/cf15cdc0f0f3
  - [bpf-next,v3,02/11] bpf: Move insn if/else into do_check_insn()
    (no matching commit)

Applied the first patch only.
Waiting for respin of the rest.