Thread (37 messages) 37 messages, 10 authors, 2021-06-09

Re: [PATCH v2] lockdown,selinux: avoid bogus SELinux lockdown permission checks

From: Alexei Starovoitov <hidden>
Date: 2021-06-05 00:09:01
Also in: bpf, linux-fsdevel, linux-security-module, lkml, netdev, selinux

On Fri, Jun 4, 2021 at 4:34 PM Paul Moore [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Again, the problem is not limited to BPF at all. kprobes is doing register-
time hooks which are equivalent to the one of BPF. Anything in run-time
trying to prevent probe_read_kernel by kprobes or BPF is broken by design.
Not being an expert on kprobes I can't really comment on that, but
right now I'm focused on trying to make things work for the BPF
helpers.  I suspect that if we can get the SELinux lockdown
implementation working properly for BPF the solution for kprobes won't
be far off.
Paul,

Both kprobe and bpf can call probe_read_kernel==copy_from_kernel_nofault
from all contexts.
Including NMI. Most of audit_log_* is not acceptable.
Just removing a wakeup is not solving anything.
Audit hooks don't belong in NMI.
Audit design needs memory allocation. Hence it's not suitable
for NMI and hardirq. But kprobes and bpf progs do run just fine there.
BPF, for example, only uses pre-allocated memory.
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