Thread (12 messages) 12 messages, 3 authors, 2019-12-16
STALE2364d

[PATCH v2 5/7] trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process

From: Alexey Budankov <hidden>
Date: 2019-12-16 07:18:06
Also in: bpf, intel-gfx, linux-perf-users, linux-security-module, lkml, selinux
Subsystem: bpf [general] (safe dynamic programs and tools), bpf [security & lsm] (security audit and enforcement using bpf), bpf [tracing], the rest, tracing · Maintainers: Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko, Eduard Zingerman, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi, KP Singh, Matt Bobrowski, Song Liu, Linus Torvalds, Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu

Open access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes.
For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure
bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <redacted>
---
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index 44bd08f2443b..0231bb363ef9 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info)
 	u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len;
 	int ret;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)))
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT)
 		return -EINVAL;
-- 
2.20.1

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