On Tue, Mar 8, 2011 at 7:10 AM, Johannes Berg [off-list ref] wrote:

On Mon, 2011-03-07 at 18:11 -0800, Javier Cardona wrote:

quoted

Notify userspace when a beacon/presp is received from a suitable mesh
peer candidate for whom no sta information exists.  Userspace can then
decide to create a sta info for the candidate.  If userspace is not
ready to authenticate the peer right away, it can create the sta info
with the authenticated flag unset and set it later.

I'm a little worried about this creating lots of bogus stations if
somebody is attacking the mesh. Will that be relevant? Would it be
better to just pass up any beacon that matches the mesh ID, trading CPU
resources for memory?

With this approach, when security is enabled, the decision to create
the station is still made by the userspace daemon.  A normal sequence
would be:

beacon is received
mesh_matches_local is true
no peer exists
send NEW_PEER_CANDIDATE notification
userspace creates unauthenticated station (optionally, to stop notifications)
userspace authenticates station
userspace sets authenticated flag

But alternatively userspace can create no station at all.  In that
case a NEW_PEER_CANDIDATE notification is sent for every beacon
received.

If somebody decides to attack the mesh by sending bogus mesh beacons,
userspace may decide not to create stations and ignore the
notifications.  You see a problem in this?

Also, this goes back to the "authenticate station" rather than full
station management in userspace, right?

Partially.  The station must still be created by userspace.  We add
the possibility to set the autenticated flag sometime after creation.
I would also like to support the creation of a mesh candidate station
with the ASSOC flag unset, which is not possible at this time.

-- 
Javier Cardona
cozybit Inc.
http://www.cozybit.com