On Mon, 9 Mar 2026 08:53:17 +0900
Masami Hiramatsu (Google) [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
quoted
@@ -1827,11 +1833,6 @@ static bool rb_cpu_meta_valid(struct ring_buffer_cpu_meta *meta, int cpu,
return false;
}
- if ((unsigned)local_read(&subbuf->commit) > subbuf_size) {
- pr_info("Ring buffer boot meta [%d] buffer invalid commit\n", cpu);
- return false;
- }
This should still be checked, although it doesn't need to fail the loop
but instead continue to the next buffer.
We already have another check of the data in the loop in
rb_meta_validate_events() so data corruption should be
handled there.
Hmm, OK.
quoted
Also, I mentioned that if the commit == RB_MISSED_EVENTS, then we know
the sub buffer was corrupted and should be skipped.
Yes, if RB_MISSED_EVENTS bit is set, the commit field is out of range.
That is checked in rb_validate_buffer().
quoted
And honestly, the commit should never be greater than the subbuf_size,
even if corrupted. As we are only worried about corruption due to cache
not writing out. That should not corrupt the commit size (now we can
ignore the flags and use page size instead).
Hmm, but if the kernel crash and reboot when it sets RB_MISSED_EVENTS,
we will see the bit is set and commit size is different.
The RB_MISSED_EVENTS is only set on the reader page.
If the kernel crashes no boot up while reading the validated buffer,
then that's a bit more than what this is supposed to handle.
Note, I think the reader_page RB_MISSED_EVENTS flag is not cleared after
read. commit ca296d32ece3 ("tracing: ring_buffer: Rewind persistent
ring buffer on reboot") drops clearing commit field for unwinding the
buffer.
But that should be fine, as it's only read only. Once tracing is
started, it should be reset.
-- Steve