On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:11:56AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
Some documented claims about LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE do not
hold for every capability check. Remove them instead of listing their
exceptions, and call it a permission instead of a hook.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@kernel.org>
Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
Changes since v1:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202436.2408244-7-mic@digikod.net (local)
- Add Serge Hallyn's Acked-by.
---
Documentation/security/landlock.rst | 8 ++++----
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 8 ++++----
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 6 +++---
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
index d81f1c2cd236..98c2e7139e8d 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock LSM: kernel documentation
==================================
:Author: Mickaël Salaün
-:Date: October 2026
+:Date: November 2026
Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing). To
harden a whole system, this feature should be available to any process,
@@ -359,9 +359,9 @@ framework in ``log.c``, compiled under ``CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG``
(automatically selected by ``CONFIG_AUDIT`` or ``CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS``).
Audit records respect audit configuration, the domain's Landlock log
-flags, and ``LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED``. Tracepoints fire unconditionally,
-independent of these settings. The denial counter (``num_denials``) is
-always incremented regardless of logging configuration.
+flags, and ``LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED``. Tracepoints fire independently of
+these settings. The denial counter (``num_denials``) is
+incremented regardless of logging configuration.
Each denial tracepoint carries a ``logged`` field reporting the
audit-logging verdict: whether the denial would be written to the audit
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
index 3d45b956b640..d00e94d8ed37 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control
=====================================
:Author: Mickaël Salaün
-:Date: October 2026
+:Date: November 2026
The goal of Landlock is to enable restriction of ambient rights (e.g. global
filesystem or network access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ acquisition via :manpage:`open_tree(2)` / :manpage:`fsmount(2)`. Namespaces
the process is already a member of when the domain is enforced are implicitly
allowed (the process could not continue running otherwise); rules describe
which new namespace types the process may acquire.
-``LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE`` gates every exercise of a capability
+``LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE`` gates the exercise of capabilities
after the domain is enforced, regardless
of how the capability was obtained (inherited credentials, ``CLONE_NEWUSER``
grant, ``setuid``/file-cap-bearing :manpage:`execve(2)`, etc.). Configuring
@@ -641,9 +641,9 @@ after a domain is enforced through user namespace entry or :manpage:`capset(2)`;
privileged sandboxes that did not set ``PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS`` may also gain
capabilities through :manpage:`execve(2)` of binaries with file capabilities.
In all cases, :manpage:`capget(2)` will report the credential's capability sets,
-but any denied capability will fail with ``EPERM`` when exercised. Do not rely
+but any denied capability will fail when exercised. Do not rely
on :manpage:`capget(2)` to determine whether the policy permits a given
-capability; only the actual operation will return ``EPERM`` upon denial.
+capability.
Truncating files
----------------
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index 24510e5d8479..c9e4ce23778b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -622,9 +622,9 @@ struct landlock_capability_attr {
* - %LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE: Restrict the use of specific Linux
* capabilities. A process in a Landlock domain that handles this permission
* is denied from exercising capabilities that are not explicitly allowed by a
- * %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule. This hook is purely restrictive: it can
- * deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can never
- * grant capabilities that the kernel already denied. Support added in
+ * %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule. This permission is purely restrictive: it
"The permission is purely restrictive"... that sounds like an
oxymoron, similar for "[The permission] can deny capabilities..." in
the sentence below.
It is not complicated though; How about just shortening the sentences
"This hook is purely restrictive: it can deny ..., but it can never
grant capabilities that the kernel already denied" down to
Landlock only reduces the capabilities that processes can use. It
does not let processes use capabilities that they don't already have
without Landlock.
?
+ * can deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can
+ * never grant capabilities that the kernel already denied. Support added in
* Landlock ABI version 12.
*/
#define LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE (1ULL << 0)
--
2.56.0
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>