On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:11:53AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
A process in a domain that denies CAP_SETPCAP could still add
capabilities outside of its permitted set to its inheritable set with
capset(2), if it held CAP_SETPCAP. cap_capset() checks CAP_SETPCAP with
cap_capable() in cap_inh_is_capped(), so the check never reaches
hook_capable(). Through file inheritable capabilities, such a set can
grant new permitted capabilities on execve() when no_new_privs is not
set, which is possible for a domain enforced by a task holding
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Add a Landlock capset hook that checks CAP_SETPCAP against the domain
under the same condition as cap_capset(). As with the mmap_addr hook,
LSMs implement their own policy in this hook: SELinux checks capset with
its own permission.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@kernel.org>
Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
Changes since v1:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202436.2408244-4-mic@digikod.net (local)
- Add Serge Hallyn's Acked-by.
---
security/landlock/cap.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/landlock/cap.c b/security/landlock/cap.c
index 10e1ca772b9c..c89e8d76db8c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/cap.c
+++ b/security/landlock/cap.c
@@ -91,6 +91,35 @@ static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
return check_cap(cred, cap, opts);
}
+/**
+ * hook_capset - Restrict inheritable capability changes
+ *
+ * @new: New credentials (unused).
+ * @old: Current credentials.
+ * @effective: New effective set (unused).
+ * @inheritable: New inheritable set.
+ * @permitted: New permitted set (unused).
+ *
+ * cap_capset() requires CAP_SETPCAP to add inheritable capabilities that are
+ * not in the old permitted set, but calls cap_capable() directly, which skips
+ * hook_capable().
It has taken me a bit of time to wrap my head around this one.
cap_capset() starts with:
if (cap_inh_is_capped() &&
!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
old->cap_permitted)))
/* incapable of using this inheritable set */
return -EPERM;
where cap_inh_is_capped() returns true if it does *not* have CAP_SETPCAP.
So when this Landlock hooks gets called, cap_capset() has already
checked that we either have CAP_SETPCAP or inheritable ⊆
(old->inheritable ⋃ old->permitted). So the Landlock hook can check
for the cap_issubset(...) condition to see whether CAP_SETPCAP had to
be "used".
Maybe it would be easier to phrase it like that?
(A more specific nit about this comment, "calls cap_capable()
*directly*" has confused me a bit, since cap_capset() calls
cap_capable() only *indirectly* through cap_inh_is_capped(). Maybe
"promptly", or "immediately" would be better?)
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
Check the same condition against the domain. commoncap runs
+ * first, so this only sees requests that commoncap allowed. capset(2) discards
+ * @new if this hook fails, so nothing is committed.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if CAP_SETPCAP use is denied.
+ */
+static int hook_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ if (cap_issubset(*inheritable,
+ cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, old->cap_permitted)))
+ return 0;
+
+ return check_cap(old, CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE);
+}
+
/**
* hook_mmap_addr - Restrict mappings below dac_mmap_min_addr
*@@ -113,6 +142,7 @@ static int hook_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, hook_capable),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, hook_capset),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, hook_mmap_addr),
};
--
2.56.0
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Code checks out, only minor comments about the documentation. It has
taken me a bit to understand how the Landlock hook's logic matches the
one in cap_capset().
—Günther