On Tue, Oct 20, 2026 at 02:55:41AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Tue, Oct 20, 2026 at 12:07:32AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
quoted
On Mon, Oct 19, 2026 at 12:31:48PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
quoted
On Mon, Oct 19, 2026 at 09:17:25PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
quoted
Protect quota from overflowing by rejecting @datalen values that
surpass over INT_MAX.
Is there an example of how this can happen, and why the limit needs to
still be so large? add_key() for example limits the payload length to
1 MiB.
I did a bit scavenging, and to my knowleddge, no. So I would retain
this as safety measure but would not consider it as a bug fix.
While it is true that add_key() has 1 MiB limit there's also
root quota. That was what I was originally thinking about
now that I scratched my head a bit.
But...
However, it is capped by /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes,
SYSCTL_INT_MAX already.
So that makes the check this patch adds irrelevant, and thus
it should be dropped.
Phew... At least it is now investigated in-depth enough, I
think.
This also makes the other safe-guard useless, so I'll drop
that too.
And likely expand the patch set to address the entry points
that you mentioned.
Br, Jarkko