Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] proc,security,selinux: let SELinux block FOLL_FORCE for /proc/self/mem
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Date: 2026-09-16 09:02:02
Also in:
linux-fsdevel, linux-mm, selinux
On Mon, Sep 14, 2026 at 01:05:39PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
On Thu, Sep 10, 2026 at 3:48 AM Christian Brauner [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Mon, 07 Sep 2026 23:00:15 +0200, Jann Horn wrote:quoted
proc,security,selinux: let SELinux block FOLL_FORCE for /proc/self/mem The goal of this series is to let SELinux prevent the use of FOLL_FORCE when a process writes into /proc/self/mem and the system is configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS (which used to be the default behavior, and is still used by current Android devices). [...]Let's move this on a shared branch that both the vfs tree and the lsm tree pull. That's the standard way of handling dependencies between two subsystems that want to route code that touches both of them. Branch is stable.For some reason (/me looks at gmail) your email never hit my inbox, I only noticed it now while reviewing Jann's patchset.
Oh weird?
Christian, can you explain why you merged LSM code that I haven't ACK'd? We've talked about this in the past and I think I've been fairly clear about it; I wouldn't merge VFS code without an ACK/Reviewed-by/etc. from you or Al, I've been expecting the same consideration from you. While I don't have a problem with a topic branch for this, can you also explain why this topic branch should live in the VFS tree? There are more changes under security/ than fs/, and unless I've misread Jann's cover letter, this entire patchset is focused around enabling LSM/SELinux controls and not necessarily anything really new from a VFS perspective.
See the reply on the bpf thread. I think this just a misunderstanding. I was under the impression that with minor tweaks v2 was already acked by lsm people. In general, if a subsystems hooks into the vfs layer and filesystems that are directly maintained by the vfs layer then the vfs tree provides the shared branch. This is not at all specific to security. It's just more pronounced for notify or security because hooks are accepted layering violations that place constraints on how vfs code itself is organized. I think this is just a misunderstanding that would've been easy to clarify without the kerfuffle.