[PATCH v3 2/3] proc: query LSMs for introspective mem access (if PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS)
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Date: 2026-09-07 21:00:30
Also in:
linux-fsdevel, linux-mm, selinux
Subsystem:
filesystems (vfs and infrastructure), proc filesystem, security subsystem, the rest · Maintainers:
Alexander Viro, Christian Brauner, Paul Moore, James Morris, "Serge E. Hallyn", Linus Torvalds
If the system is running with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, LSMs currently have no good opportunity to block a process from overwriting read-only code in its own address space through FOLL_FORCE writes via /proc/self/mem. The security_ptrace_access_check() LSM hook is bypassed when a process opens /proc/self/mem because this is considered "introspection". This causes a hole in SELinux EXECMEM enforcement, which tries to ensure that a process cannot create executable anonymous pages. PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE prevents that and ensures that such FOLL_FORCE accesses are only possible when the LSM allows ptrace() attachment; but it is unclear how quickly PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE can be deployed in environments running lots of third-party code, such as Android. So, introduce a new LSM hook that can forbid FOLL_FORCE specifically for such "introspective" accesses. Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> --- fs/proc/base.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++ security/security.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index bec6197329dc..295b21203c7f 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c@@ -851,6 +851,11 @@ static int __mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned int mode) /* private_data for proc_mem_operations */ struct mem_private { struct mm_struct *mm; + /* + * Was the ptrace access check on open bypassed because the opener used + * the same MM (introspection)? + */ + bool opened_by_owner; }; static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
@@ -864,12 +869,14 @@ static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(priv->mm)) return priv->mm ? PTR_ERR(priv->mm) : -ESRCH; + priv->opened_by_owner = priv->mm == current->mm; file->private_data = no_free_ptr(priv); return 0; } static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm) { + struct mem_private *priv = file->private_data; struct task_struct *task; bool ptrace_active = false;
@@ -884,10 +891,13 @@ static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm) READ_ONCE(task->parent) == current; put_task_struct(task); } - return ptrace_active; + if (!ptrace_active) + return false; + break; default: - return true; + break; } + return security_mem_foll_force(file->f_cred, priv->opened_by_owner) == 0; } static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 65c9609ec207..12f84a1e6fab 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, binder_transfer_file, const struct cred *from, LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ptrace_access_check, struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ptrace_traceme, struct task_struct *parent) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mem_foll_force, const struct cred *subject, bool opened_by_owner) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, capget, const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, capset, struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 153e9043058f..e8bc2e644241 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h@@ -338,6 +338,7 @@ int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, const struct cred *to, const struct file *file); int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode); int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent); +int security_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject, bool opened_by_owner); int security_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
@@ -676,6 +677,12 @@ static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) return cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); } +static inline int security_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject, + bool opened_by_owner) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int security_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 71aea8fdf014..2cde1efdb7a6 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c@@ -595,6 +595,31 @@ int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, parent); } +/** + * security_mem_foll_force() - Check if FOLL_FORCE is allowed + * @subject: credentials using which /proc/$pid/mem was opened + * @opened_by_owner: whether checks on open() were bypassed because the opener + * has the same MM as the target + * + * Check if FOLL_FORCE is allowed for accessing process memory through + * /proc/$pid/mem. opened_by_owner signals whether the opener's MM was the same + * as the target MM, meaning the security_ptrace_access_check() hook was + * bypassed on open(). + * (Current current->mm does not matter for this; for example, if write() is + * called on an FD that was received from another process which obtained it with + * open("/proc/self/mem"), @opened_by_owner is still true.) + * + * Note that this hook is only designed to be useful in the opened_by_owner + * case, where the subject credentials effectively also describe the object. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject, + bool opened_by_owner) +{ + return call_int_hook(mem_foll_force, subject, opened_by_owner); +} + /** * security_capget() - Get the capability sets for a process * @target: target process
--
2.55.0.1003.g10538fe699-goog