On Jan 4, 2023, at 4:43 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen [off-list ref] wrote:

On Tue, Dec 13, 2022 at 07:33:55PM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:

quoted

Parse the X.509 Key Usage.  The key usage extension defines the purpose of
the key contained in the certificate.

  id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 15 }

     KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
          digitalSignature        (0),
          contentCommitment       (1),
          keyEncipherment         (2),
          dataEncipherment        (3),
          keyAgreement            (4),
          keyCertSign             (5),
          cRLSign                 (6),
          encipherOnly            (7),
          decipherOnly            (8) }

If the keyCertSign is set, store it in the x509_certificate structure.
This will be used in a follow on patch that requires knowing the
certificate key usage type.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h      |  1 +
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index b4443e507153..edb22cf04eed 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c

@@ -579,6 +579,28 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,

		return 0;
	}

+	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_keyUsage) {
+		/*
+		 * Get hold of the keyUsage bit string to validate keyCertSign
+		 * v[1] is the encoding size
+		 *       (Expect either 0x02 or 0x03, making it 1 or 2 bytes)
+		 * v[2] is the number of unused bits in the bit string
+		 *       (If >= 3 keyCertSign is missing)
+		 * v[3] and possibly v[4] contain the bit string
+		 * 0x04 is where KeyCertSign lands in this bit string (from
+		 *      RFC 5280 4.2.1.3)
+		 */
+		if (v[0] != ASN1_BTS)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		if (vlen < 4)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		if (v[1] == 0x02 && v[2] <= 2 && (v[3] & 0x04))
+			ctx->cert->kcs_set = true;
+		else if (vlen > 4 && v[1] == 0x03 && (v[3] & 0x04))
+			ctx->cert->kcs_set = true;
+		return 0;

This is much more easier to follow thanks to explanation.

quoted

+	}
+
	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
		/* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
		ctx->raw_akid = v;

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 7c5c0ad1c22e..74a9f929e400 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct x509_certificate {

	bool		unsupported_sig;	/* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */
	bool		blacklisted;
	bool		root_ca;		/* T if basic constraints CA is set */
+	bool		kcs_set;		/* T if keyCertSign is set */
};

/*
-- 
2.27.0

LGTM but I'll hold with reviewed-by's up until the patch set overally
looks good to me and I have actually tested it.

Thanks for your review.  I will make all the other changes you brought up with
the other patches in the next round.