Re: [PATCH v3 09/10] KEYS: CA link restriction
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Date: 2023-01-04 11:55:54
Also in:
keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity, lkml
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Date: 2023-01-04 11:55:54
Also in:
keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity, lkml
On Wed, Jan 04, 2023 at 11:51:52AM +0000, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Tue, Dec 13, 2022 at 07:34:00PM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:quoted
+/** + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to. + * @type: The type of key being added. + * @payload: The payload of the new key. + * @trust_keyring: Unused. + * + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new + * certificate as being ok to link. + * + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the + * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported + * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but + * the signature check cannot be performed. + */ +int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring, + const struct key_type *type, + const union key_payload *payload, + struct key *trust_keyring)Why you want to define trust_keyring, other than matching the parameter list in restrict_link_by_signature()? Also if it is unused, it should be then just "struct key *)", right?
Please ignore, I forgot how this worked, i.e. "restriction" is set to the correct function so this looks correct to me :-) So it's good. Sorry for the confusion. BR, Jarkko