Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From: Dov Murik <hidden>
Date: 2022-02-03 11:04:47
Also in:
linux-coco, linux-efi, lkml
On 03/02/2022 8:16, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
Hi,quoted
quoted
I think the module should fail noisily. See above for autoload. In case the module is loaded (either manually by the admin, or because efi.coco_secret != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) and it can't actually load the secrets we want know why ...Note that the AmdSev build of OVMF always publishes LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID in the EFI table. Even when LAUNCH_SECRET was not executed. In such cases the secret area will be empty.Hmm, ok. Why? I assume the secret area is filled by the host and ovmf doesn't even look at it?
Exactly. OVMF just reserves this area, and puts its address+size in the EFI config table. It doesn't care about its format and usage. There are currently two "users" for the actual data in this memory area: 1. grub's efisecret module (which reads the disk passphrase from an entry in the secret area) 2. linux's efi_secret module (which we're discussing here)
quoted
If we keep only the 'efi.coco_secret != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR' check, we'll get errors from efi_secret for every VM launch that doesn't undergo LAUNCH_SECRET. I don't think that's good.Well, if that is a common case the module could either print nothing or log KERN_INFO level instead of KERN_ERROR.
What if the user doesn't inject a secret and doesn't include the
efi_secret module at all in the initrd? request_module("efi_secret")
will fail.
I can ignore the error code of request_module("efi_secret") but that
feels bad.
quoted
If we *do* want to check that the area starts with EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID (like I think we should), we need all the checks before that, like checking that the area is big enough, and that all the memremap()s succeed -- before actually comparing the header_guid. The checks are basically prerequisites for calling efi_guidcmp() safely.It is still not fully clear to me why you want do that check twice.
I want to load the module only if secrets were injected by the Guest Owner. Again, I'm open to ideas on how to de-duplicate these early checks, if that's important. -Dov