Thread (37 messages) 37 messages, 8 authors, 2022-02-09

Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated

From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: 2022-02-03 06:16:39
Also in: linux-coco, linux-efi, lkml

  Hi,
quoted
I think the module should fail noisily.  See above for autoload.  In
case the module is loaded (either manually by the admin, or because
efi.coco_secret != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) and it can't actually load
the secrets we want know why ...
Note that the AmdSev build of OVMF always publishes
LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID in the EFI table.  Even when
LAUNCH_SECRET was not executed.  In such cases the secret area will be
empty.
Hmm, ok.  Why?  I assume the secret area is filled by the host and ovmf
doesn't even look at it?
If we keep only the 'efi.coco_secret != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR' check,
we'll get errors from efi_secret for every VM launch that doesn't
undergo LAUNCH_SECRET.  I don't think that's good.
Well, if that is a common case the module could either print nothing or
log KERN_INFO level instead of KERN_ERROR.
If we *do* want to check that the area starts with
EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID (like I think we should), we need all the
checks before that, like checking that the area is big enough, and that
all the memremap()s succeed -- before actually comparing the
header_guid.  The checks are basically prerequisites for calling
efi_guidcmp() safely.
It is still not fully clear to me why you want do that check twice.

take care,
  Gerd
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