Thread (31 messages) 31 messages, 3 authors, 2021-09-09

Re: [PATCH v5 02/12] integrity: Do not allow machine keyring updates following init

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Date: 2021-09-09 13:46:55
Also in: keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity, lkml

On Tue, 2021-09-07 at 12:01 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
The machine keyring is setup during init.  No additional keys should be
allowed to be added afterwards.  Leave the permission as read only.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
v2: Initial version
v4: Unmodified from v2
v5: Rename to machine keyring
---
 security/integrity/digsig.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 8c315be8ad99..5a75ac2c4dbe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -140,7 +140,8 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;
-	perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;
I would add here inline comment to say mostly the same as the commit
message does.
+	if (id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
+		perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;
 
 out:
 	return __integrity_init_keyring(id, perm, restriction);
I checked patch 01 but I lost the email somewhere. The keyring definition
looks now sane.

/Jarkko
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