On 2/14/2021 10:21 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:

Hi Casey,

On Tue, 2021-01-26 at 08:40 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:

quoted

Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
allow the user to specify an active securty module to apply
filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
security module to use for a particular rule.

Thanks, Casey.

(This patch description line length seems short.)

quoted

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  8 +++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index e35263f97fc1..a7943d40466f 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Description:
 			base:	[[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=]
 				[euid=] [fowner=] [fsname=]]
 			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
-				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
+				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=] [lsm=]]

"[lsm=]" either requires all LSM rules types (e.g. {subj/obj}_user,
role, type) to be exactly the same for multiple LSMs or all of the LSM
rule types are applicable to only a single LSM.  Supporting multiple
LSMs with exactly the same LSM labels doesn't seem worth the effort.  
Keep it simple - a single rule, containing any LSM rule types, is
applicable to a single LSM.

quoted

 			option:	[[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
 				[appraise_flag=] [keyrings=]
 		  base:

@@ -114,6 +114,12 @@ Description:

 			measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ

+		It is possible to explicitly specify which security
+		module a rule applies to using lsm=.  If the security
+		modules specified is not active on the system the rule
+		will be rejected.  If lsm= is not specified the first
+		security module registered on the system will be assumed.
+
 		Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::

 			measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 8002683003e6..de72b719c90c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c

@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
 		void *rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]; /* LSM file metadata specific */
 		char *args_p;	/* audit value */
 		int type;	/* audit type */
+		int which_lsm; /* which of the rules to use */
 	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];

Even if we wanted to support multiple LSMs within the same rule having
both "rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]" and "which_lsm" shouldn't be necessary.  
The LSMBLOB_ENTRIES should already identify the LSM.

To support a single LSM per policy rule, "which_lsm" should be defined
outside of lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES].  This will simplify the rest of the code
(e.g. matching/freeing rules).

	int which_lsm;          /* which of the rules to use */
	struct {
                void *rule;        /* LSM file metadata specific */
                char *args_p;   /* audit value */
                int type;       /* audit type */
        } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];

quoted

 	char *fsname;
 	struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */

@@ -90,17 +91,15 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {

 /**
  * ima_lsm_isset - Is a rule set for any of the active security modules
- * @rules: The set of IMA rules to check
+ * @entry: the rule entry to examine
+ * @lsm_rule: the specific rule type in question
  *
- * If a rule is set for any LSM return true, otherwise return false.
+ * If a rule is set return true, otherwise return false.
  */
-static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(void *rules[])
+static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, int lsm_rule)
 {
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
-		if (rules[i])
-			return true;
+	if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules[entry->lsm[lsm_rule].which_lsm])
+		return true;

If each IMA policy rule is limited to a specific LSM, then the test
would be "entry->which_lsm".

quoted

 	return false;
 }

@@ -273,6 +272,20 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
 }
 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);

+static int ima_rule_lsm __ro_after_init;
+
+static int __init ima_rule_lsm_init(char *str)
+{
+	ima_rule_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
+	if (ima_rule_lsm < 0) {
+		ima_rule_lsm = 0;
+		pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_rule_lsm=", ima_rule_lsm_init);

The patch description refers to "ima_rules_lsm=".  Please update one or
the other.

thanks,

Mimi

Would these changes match your suggestion?

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 9ac673472781..e80956548243 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c

@@ -78,11 +78,11 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
 	bool (*uid_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t);    /* Handlers for operators       */
 	bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */
 	int pcr;
+	int which_lsm; /* which of the rules to use */
 	struct {
 		void *rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]; /* LSM file metadata specific */
 		char *args_p;	/* audit value */
 		int type;	/* audit type */
-		int which_lsm; /* which of the rules to use */
 	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
 	char *fsname;
 	struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
  */
 static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, int lsm_rule)
 {
-	if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules[entry->lsm[lsm_rule].which_lsm])
+	if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules[entry->which_lsm])
 		return true;
 	return false;
 }

@@ -272,19 +272,19 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
 }
 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
 
-static int ima_rule_lsm __ro_after_init;
+static int ima_rules_lsm __ro_after_init;
 
-static int __init ima_rule_lsm_init(char *str)
+static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
 {
-	ima_rule_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
-	if (ima_rule_lsm < 0) {
-		ima_rule_lsm = 0;
+	ima_rules_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
+	if (ima_rules_lsm < 0) {
+		ima_rules_lsm = 0;
 		pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
 	}
 
 	return 1;
 }
-__setup("ima_rule_lsm=", ima_rule_lsm_init);
+__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
 
 static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
 {

@@ -1515,7 +1515,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				result = -EINVAL;
 				break;
 			}
-			entry->lsm->which_lsm = result;
+			entry->which_lsm = result;
 			result = 0;
 			break;
 		case Opt_err:

@@ -1573,7 +1573,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
-		entry->lsm[i].which_lsm = ima_rule_lsm;
+		entry->which_lsm = ima_rules_lsm;
 
 	result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
 	if (result) {

@@ -1827,9 +1827,9 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 		seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
 	if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
 		seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
-	if (entry->lsm->which_lsm >= 0)
+	if (entry->which_lsm >= 0)
 		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm),
-			   lsm_slot_to_name(entry->lsm->which_lsm));
+			   lsm_slot_to_name(entry->which_lsm));
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	seq_puts(m, "\n");
 	return 0;