On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 9:04 PM Mickaël Salaün [off-list ref] wrote:

Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead
to a privilege escalation.  Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker
to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing
malicious activities.  Thanks to  ptrace_may_access(), various part of
the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee.

A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process
and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating
processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a
target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target
process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer).

Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <redacted>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <redacted>

Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>