Re: Commit 13c164b1a186 - regression for LSMs/SELinux?
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: 2020-09-21 16:30:11
Also in:
autofs, selinux
On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 06:09:22PM +0200, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
[adding Linus and Al] On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 04:51:35PM +0200, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:quoted
Hi folks, It seems that after commit 13c164b1a186 ("autofs: switch to kernel_write") there is now an extra LSM permission required (for the current task to write to the automount pipe) for processes accessing some yet-to-to-be mounted directory on which an autofs mount is set up. The call chain is: [...] autofs_wait() -> autofs_notify_daemon() -> autofs_write() -> kernel_write() -> rw_verify_area() -> security_file_permission() The bug report that led me to this commit is at [1]. Technically, this is a regression for LSM users, since this is a kernel-internal operation and an LSM permission for the current task shouldn't be required. Can this patch be reverted? Perhaps __kernel_{read|write}() could instead be renamed to kernel_*_nocheck() so that the name is more descriptive?So we obviously should not break existing user space and need to fix this ASAP. The trivial "fix" would be to export __kernel_write again and switch autofs to use it. The other option would be a FMODE flag to bypass security checks, only to be set if the callers ensures they've been valided (i.e. in autofs_prepare_pipe). Any opinions?
Reexport for now. Incidentally, what is LSM doing rejecting writes into a pipe?