Re: Commit 13c164b1a186 - regression for LSMs/SELinux?
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Date: 2020-09-21 16:09:22
Also in:
autofs, selinux
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Date: 2020-09-21 16:09:22
Also in:
autofs, selinux
[adding Linus and Al] On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 04:51:35PM +0200, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
Hi folks,
It seems that after commit 13c164b1a186 ("autofs: switch to
kernel_write") there is now an extra LSM permission required (for the
current task to write to the automount pipe) for processes accessing
some yet-to-to-be mounted directory on which an autofs mount is set
up. The call chain is:
[...]
autofs_wait() ->
autofs_notify_daemon() ->
autofs_write() ->
kernel_write() ->
rw_verify_area() ->
security_file_permission()
The bug report that led me to this commit is at [1].
Technically, this is a regression for LSM users, since this is a
kernel-internal operation and an LSM permission for the current task
shouldn't be required. Can this patch be reverted? Perhaps
__kernel_{read|write}() could instead be renamed to kernel_*_nocheck()
so that the name is more descriptive?So we obviously should not break existing user space and need to fix this ASAP. The trivial "fix" would be to export __kernel_write again and switch autofs to use it. The other option would be a FMODE flag to bypass security checks, only to be set if the callers ensures they've been valided (i.e. in autofs_prepare_pipe). Any opinions?