Thread (56 messages) 56 messages, 8 authors, 2020-07-22

Re: [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Date: 2020-07-14 11:00:02
Also in: intel-gfx, linux-doc, linux-man, lkml, selinux

On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 03:51:52PM -0300, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote:
quoted
quoted
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 856d98c36f56..a2397f724c10 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -11595,7 +11595,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
 		 */
 		err = -EACCES;
-		if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
+		if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
 			goto err_cred;
 	}
quoted
makes monitoring simpler and even more secure to use since Perf tool need
not to start/stop/single-step and read/write registers and memory and so on
like a debugger or strace-like tool. What do you think?
I tend to agree, Peter?
So this basically says that if CAP_PERFMON, we don't care about the
ptrace() permissions? Just like how CAP_SYS_PTRACE would always allow
the ptrace checks?

I suppose that makes sense.
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