Re: [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability
From: Alexey Budankov <hidden>
Date: 2020-07-13 12:38:08
Also in:
intel-gfx, linux-doc, linux-man, lkml, selinux
On 13.07.2020 15:17, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote:
Em Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 12:48:25PM +0300, Alexey Budankov escreveu:quoted
On 10.07.2020 20:09, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote:quoted
Em Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 05:30:50PM +0300, Alexey Budankov escreveu:quoted
On 10.07.2020 16:31, Ravi Bangoria wrote:quoted
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Currently access to perf_events, i915_perf and other performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel is open only for a privileged process [1] with CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability enabled in the process effective set [2].quoted
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This patch set introduces CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON would assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel.quoted
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I'm seeing an issue with CAP_PERFMON when I try to record data for a specific target. I don't know whether this is sort of a regression or an expected behavior.quoted
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Thanks for reporting and root causing this case. The behavior looks like kind of expected since currently CAP_PERFMON takes over the related part of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials only. Actually Perf security docs [1] say that access control is also subject to CAP_SYS_PTRACE credentials.quoted
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I think that stating that in the error message would be helpful, after all, who reads docs? 8-)quoted
At least those who write it :D ...Everybody should read it, sure :-)quoted
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I.e., this: $ ./perf stat ls Error: Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. $ Could become: $ ./perf stat ls Error: Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. Right now only CAP_PERFMON is granted, you may need CAP_SYS_PTRACE. $It would better provide reference to perf security docs in the tool output.So add a 3rd line: $ ./perf stat ls Error: Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. Right now only CAP_PERFMON is granted, you may need CAP_SYS_PTRACE. Please read the 'Perf events and tool security' document: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html
If it had that patch below then message change would not be required. However this two sentences in the end of whole message would still add up: "Please read the 'Perf events and tool security' document: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html"
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Looks like extending ptrace_may_access() check for perf_events with CAP_PERFMONYou mean the following?
Exactly that.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 856d98c36f56..a2397f724c10 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c@@ -11595,7 +11595,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply). */ err = -EACCES; - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) + if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) goto err_cred; }quoted
makes monitoring simpler and even more secure to use since Perf tool need not to start/stop/single-step and read/write registers and memory and so on like a debugger or strace-like tool. What do you think?I tend to agree, Peter?quoted
Alexeiquoted
- Arnaldo
Alexei