On Sat, Jun 27, 2020 at 07:43:35PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
quoted
+static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
+ void *token)
+{
+ u64 mrsigner[4];
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+ int j;
+
+ /* Check that the required attributes have been authorized. */
+ if (encl->secs_attributes & ~encl->allowed_attributes)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ ret = sgx_get_key_hash(sigstruct->modulus, mrsigner);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto err_out;
+ }
That test should be the first thing this function or its caller does.
Hmm, I was going to say that SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can't be checked until
encl->lock is held, but that's not true for this path as mutual exclusion
is provided by the SGX_ENCL_IOCTL flag. So yeah, this can be checked at
the same time as SGX_ENCL_CREATED in sgx_ioc_enclave_init().
quoted
+ for (i = 0; i < SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT; i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT; j++) {
Ew, what's that double-loop for?
It tries to init an enclave a bunch of times. Why does it need to init
more than once?
ENCLS[EINIT] is interruptible because it has such a high latency, e.g. 50k+
cycles on success. If an IRQ/NMI/SMI becomes pending, EINIT may fail with
SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT so that the event can be serviced.
The idea behind the double loop is to try EINIT in a tight loop, then back
off and sleep for a while before retrying that tight inner loop.
quoted
+ ret = sgx_einit(sigstruct, token, encl->secs.epc_page,
+ mrsigner);
+ if (ret == SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
+ continue;
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ret != SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
+ break;
+
+ msleep_interruptible(SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME);
+
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) {
+ if (encls_failed(ret))
+ ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT");
+
+ sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ } else if (ret) {
+ pr_debug("EINIT returned %d\n", ret);
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ } else {
+ atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags);
+ }
+
+err_out:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
+ *
+ * @filep: open file to /dev/sgx
@encl: pointer to an enclave instance (via ioctl() file pointer)
quoted
+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_init instance
+ *
+ * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The
+ * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match
+ * the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * SGX error code on EINIT failure,
+ * -errno otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct;
+ struct sgx_enclave_init einit;
+ struct page *initp_page;
+ void *token;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
Might just as well check the other flags: doing EINIT on an already
initialized enclave - SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED - is perhaps a nono or
similarly on a SGX_ENCL_DEAD enclave.
And you could do similar sanity checks in the other ioctl functions.
Ya, as above, SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can be checked here.
SGX_ENCL_DEAD is actually already checked in in the top level sgx_ioctl(),
i.e. the check in sgx_encl_add_page() can technically be flat out dropped.
I say "technically" because I'm a bit torn over SGX_ENCL_DEAD; encl->lock
must be held to SGX_ENCL_DEAD (the page fault and reclaim flows rely on
this), but as it stands today only ioctl() paths (guarded by SGX_ENCL_IOCTL)
and sgx_release() (makes the ioctls() unreachable) set SGX_ENCL_DEAD.
So it's safe to check SGX_ENCL_DEAD from ioctl() context without holding
encl->lock, at least in the current code base, but it feels weird/sketchy.
In the end I don't think I have a strong opinion. Removing the technically
unnecessary DEAD check in sgx_encl_add_page() is the simplest change, so it
may make sense to do that and nothing more for initial upstreaming. Long
term, I fully expect we'll add paths that set SGX_ENCL_DEAD outside of
ioctl() context, e.g. to handle EPC OOM, but it wouldn't be a bad thing to
have a standalone commit in a future series to add DEAD checks (under
encl->lock) in the ADD and INIT flows.