Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
From: Sean Christopherson <hidden>
Date: 2019-06-04 20:36:51
Also in:
lkml, selinux
From: Sean Christopherson <hidden>
Date: 2019-06-04 20:36:51
Also in:
lkml, selinux
On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 01:29:10PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 4:32 PM Sean Christopherson [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr,diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 47f58cfb6a19..0562775424a0 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h@@ -1446,6 +1446,14 @@ * @bpf_prog_free_security: * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog. * + * Security hooks for Intel SGX enclaves. + * + * @enclave_load: + * On success, returns 0 and optionally adjusts @allowed_prot + * @vma: the source memory region of the enclave page being loaded. + * @prot: the initial protection of the enclave page.What do you mean "initial"? The page is always mapped PROT_NONE when this is called, right? I feel like I must be missing something here.
Initial protection in the EPCM. Yet another reason to ignore SECINFO.