On Sun, Jun 2, 2019 at 11:29 PM Xing, Cedric [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
From: Christopherson, Sean J
Sent: Friday, May 31, 2019 4:32 PM
Do not allow an enclave page to be mapped with PROT_EXEC if the source page is backed by a
file on a noexec file system.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <redacted>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
index c30acd3fbbdd..5f71be7cbb01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
@@ -576,6 +576,27 @@ static int __sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long
addr,
return ret;
}
+static int sgx_encl_page_protect(unsigned long src, unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long *allowed_prot)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+
+ if (!(*allowed_prot & VM_EXEC))
+ goto do_check;
+
+ down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm, src);
+ if (!vma || (vma->vm_file && path_noexec(&vma->vm_file->f_path)))
+ *allowed_prot &= ~VM_EXEC;
Testing (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC) == 0 should be a better approach.
I think I agree, although that would need a comment explaining why it works.