Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in task_is_descendant
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Date: 2018-10-25 02:15:52
Also in:
lkml
Subsystem:
ptrace support, security subsystem, the rest, yama security module · Maintainers:
Oleg Nesterov, Paul Moore, James Morris, "Serge E. Hallyn", Linus Torvalds, Kees Cook
Oleg Nesterov wrote:
On 10/22, Tetsuo Handa wrote:quoted
quoted
And again, I do not know how/if yama ensures that child is rcu-protected, perhaps task_is_descendant() needs to check pid_alive(child) right after rcu_read_lock() ?Since the caller (ptrace() path) called get_task_struct(child), child itself can't be released. Do we still need pid_alive(child) ?get_task_struct(child) can only ensure that this task_struct can't be freed.
The report says that it is a use-after-free read at walker = rcu_dereference(walker->real_parent); which means that walker was already released.
Suppose that this child exits after get_task_struct(), then its real_parent exits too and calls call_rcu(delayed_put_task_struct). Now, when task_is_descendant() is called, rcu_read_lock() can happen after rcu gp, iow child->parent can be already freed/reused/unmapped. We need to ensure that child is still protected by RCU.
I wonder whether pid_alive() test helps. We can get [ 40.620318] parent or walker is dead. [ 40.624146] tracee is dead. messages using below patch and reproducer. ----------
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 99cfddd..0d9d786 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c@@ -385,6 +385,7 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request, if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) goto out; + schedule_timeout_killable(HZ); task_lock(task); retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS); task_unlock(task);
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index ffda91a..a231ec6 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c@@ -283,6 +283,11 @@ static int task_is_descendant(struct task_struct *parent, return 0; rcu_read_lock(); + if (!pid_alive(parent) || !pid_alive(walker)) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + printk("parent or walker is dead.\n"); + return 0; + } if (!thread_group_leader(parent)) parent = rcu_dereference(parent->group_leader); while (walker->pid > 0) {
@@ -315,6 +320,10 @@ static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer, bool found = false; rcu_read_lock(); + if (!pid_alive(tracee)) { + printk("tracee is dead.\n"); + goto unlock; + } /* * If there's already an active tracing relationship, then make an ---------- ----------
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <poll.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (fork() == 0) {
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, getppid(), NULL, NULL);
_exit(0);
}
poll(NULL, 0, 100);
return 0;
}
----------
But since "child" has at least one reference, reading "child->real_parent" should
be safe. Therefore, I think that bailing out due to pid_is_alive(child) == false
(like above patch does) cannot avoid this problem...