[PATCH v5 2/5] Smack: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
From: jannh@google.com (Jann Horn)
Date: 2018-09-26 21:31:04
Also in:
lkml, selinux
From: jannh@google.com (Jann Horn)
Date: 2018-09-26 21:31:04
Also in:
lkml, selinux
On Wed, Sep 26, 2018 at 10:35 PM Casey Schaufler [off-list ref] wrote:
A ptrace access check with mode PTRACE_MODE_SCHED gets called from process switching code. This precludes the use of audit, as the locking is incompatible. Don't do audit in the PTRACE_MODE_SCHED case. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <redacted> --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 340fc30ad85d..ffa95bcab599 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c@@ -422,7 +422,8 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_smack *tsp; struct smack_known *tracer_known; - if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) { + if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0 && + (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) == 0) {
If you ORed PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT into the flags when calling the security hook, you could drop this patch, right?