L Lukasz Pawelczyk #
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Hi, On Thu, 2018-09-06 at 11:53 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
Lukasz, does this analysis seem correct to you? This is code you wrote in 2014.
It seems correct. Moreover I've sent a patch that fixes this bug long time ago with the namespace series. https://lists.linux-foundation.org/pipermail/containers/2015-October/036318.html Not sure this is the latest version. The latest I ever wrote can be found here: https://github.com/Havner/smack-namespace/commit/52d6e4be2db51e9aca53e0e112a7ff9625000994 Without namespaces, parts of this patch are probably irrelevant, but it does fix this bug and one or two similar elsewhere. Best regards, Lukasz
-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Smack: wrong-looking capable() check in smk_ptrace_rule_check() Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 20:22:35 +0200 From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> CC: linux-security-module <redacted>, kernel list [off-list ref] Hi! I noticed the following check in smk_ptrace_rule_check(): if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known-quoted
smk_known)rc = 0; else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN) rc = -EACCES; else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) rc = 0; else rc = -EACCES; Note that smk_ptrace_rule_check() can be called from not just smack_ptrace_access_check() and smack_ptrace_traceme(), but also smack_bprm_set_creds(). AFAICS this means that if a task executes with a smack privilege transition and smack_ptrace_rule is SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT, whether the execution is permitted depends on whether _the debugged task_ has CAP_SYS_PTRACE (and not on whether the debugger has that capability). This seems like it's probably unintentional?
-- Lukasz Pawelczyk Samsung R&D Institute Poland Samsung Electronics