Hi,
On Thu, 2018-09-06 at 11:53 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
Lukasz, does this analysis seem correct to you? This is code you
wrote in 2014.
It seems correct.
Moreover I've sent a patch that fixes this bug long time ago with the
namespace series.
https://lists.linux-foundation.org/pipermail/containers/2015-October/036318.html
Not sure this is the latest version. The latest I ever wrote can be
found here:
https://github.com/Havner/smack-namespace/commit/52d6e4be2db51e9aca53e0e112a7ff9625000994
Without namespaces, parts of this patch are probably irrelevant, but it
does fix this bug and one or two similar elsewhere.
Best regards,
Lukasz
-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: Smack: wrong-looking capable() check in
smk_ptrace_rule_check()
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 20:22:35 +0200
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
CC: linux-security-module <redacted>,
kernel list [off-list ref]
Hi!
I noticed the following check in smk_ptrace_rule_check():
if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known-quoted
smk_known)
rc = 0;
else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
rc = -EACCES;
else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
rc = 0;
else
rc = -EACCES;
Note that smk_ptrace_rule_check() can be called from not just
smack_ptrace_access_check() and smack_ptrace_traceme(), but also
smack_bprm_set_creds(). AFAICS this means that if a task executes
with
a smack privilege transition and smack_ptrace_rule is
SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT, whether the execution is permitted depends on
whether _the debugged task_ has CAP_SYS_PTRACE (and not on whether
the
debugger has that capability).
This seems like it's probably unintentional?
--
Lukasz Pawelczyk
Samsung R&D Institute Poland
Samsung Electronics