[RFC][PATCH 0/5] Mount, Filesystem and Keyrings notifications
From: dhowells@redhat.com (David Howells)
Date: 2018-07-24 16:00:35
Also in:
keyrings, linux-fsdevel, lkml
Casey Schaufler [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
(1) Mount topology and reconfiguration change events.With the possibility of unprivileged mounting you're going to have to address access control on events. If root in a user namespace mounts a filesystem you may have a case where the "real" user wouldn't want the listener to receive a notification.
Can you clarify who the listener is in this case? Note that mount topology events don't leak outside of the mount namespace they're generated in. That said, if you, a random user, put a watchpoint on "/" you can see the mount events triggered by another random user in the same mount namespace. I don't see a way to control this except by resorting to the LSM since UNIX doesn't have 'notify' permission bits. But for each event, I can associate an object label, derived from the source, and use f_cred on the notification queue to provide a subject label.
quoted
(2) Superblocks EIO, ENOSPC and EDQUOT events (not complete yet).Here, too. If SELinux (for example) policy says you can't see anything on a filesystem you shouldn't get notifications about things that happen to that filesystem.
Yep. Sounds like I need to refer that to the LSM as above. It's a bit easier for specifically nominated sb sources since you might only need to do the check once at sb_notify() time. If there's a general queue that all sbs contribute to, however, then things become more complicated as the checks have to be done at do-we-write-into-this-queue? time.
quoted
(3) Key/keyring changes eventsAnd again, I should only get notifications about keys and keyrings I have access to.
Currently, you can only watch keys that grant you View permission, which might suffice.
I expect that you intentionally left off (4) User injected events at this point, but it's an obvious extension. That is going to require access controls (remember kdbus) so I think you'd do well to design them in now rather than have some security module hack like me come along later and "fix" it.
Yeah - the thought had occurred to me, but there needs to be some way to define a 'source' and a way to connect them. Also, would you want a general source that anyone can contribute through, specific sources where you have to directly connect or namespace-restricted sources? David -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html