Thread (18 messages) 18 messages, 3 authors, 2018-08-02

[RFC][PATCH 0/5] Mount, Filesystem and Keyrings notifications

From: dhowells@redhat.com (David Howells)
Date: 2018-07-24 16:00:35
Also in: keyrings, linux-fsdevel, lkml

Casey Schaufler [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
 (1) Mount topology and reconfiguration change events.
With the possibility of unprivileged mounting you're going to have to
address access control on events.  If root in a user namespace mounts a
filesystem you may have a case where the "real" user wouldn't want the
listener to receive a notification.
Can you clarify who the listener is in this case?

Note that mount topology events don't leak outside of the mount namespace
they're generated in.

That said, if you, a random user, put a watchpoint on "/" you can see the
mount events triggered by another random user in the same mount namespace.  I
don't see a way to control this except by resorting to the LSM since UNIX
doesn't have 'notify' permission bits.

But for each event, I can associate an object label, derived from the source,
and use f_cred on the notification queue to provide a subject label.
quoted
 (2) Superblocks EIO, ENOSPC and EDQUOT events (not complete yet).
Here, too. If SELinux (for example) policy says you can't see
anything on a filesystem you shouldn't get notifications about
things that happen to that filesystem.
Yep.  Sounds like I need to refer that to the LSM as above.

It's a bit easier for specifically nominated sb sources since you might only
need to do the check once at sb_notify() time.  If there's a general queue
that all sbs contribute to, however, then things become more complicated as
the checks have to be done at do-we-write-into-this-queue? time.
quoted
 (3) Key/keyring changes events
And again, I should only get notifications about keys and
keyrings I have access to.
Currently, you can only watch keys that grant you View permission, which might
suffice.
I expect that you intentionally left off

   (4) User injected events

at this point, but it's an obvious extension. That is going
to require access controls (remember kdbus) so I think you'd
do well to design them in now rather than have some security
module hack like me come along later and "fix" it. 
Yeah - the thought had occurred to me, but there needs to be some way to
define a 'source' and a way to connect them.  Also, would you want a general
source that anyone can contribute through, specific sources where you have to
directly connect or namespace-restricted sources?

David
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