On Tue, 2018-07-24 at 11:57 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:

On 7/24/2018 9:00 AM, David Howells wrote:

quoted

Casey Schaufler [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

quoted

 (1) Mount topology and reconfiguration change events.

With the possibility of unprivileged mounting you're going to have to
address access control on events.  If root in a user namespace mounts a
filesystem you may have a case where the "real" user wouldn't want the
listener to receive a notification.

Can you clarify who the listener is in this case?

That would be anyone with a watchpoint set.

And that process would have had the privilege to do so ...

quoted

Note that mount topology events don't leak outside of the mount namespace
they're generated in.

That said, if you, a random user, put a watchpoint on "/" you can see the
mount events triggered by another random user in the same mount
namespace.  I
don't see a way to control this except by resorting to the LSM since UNIX
doesn't have 'notify' permission bits.

I would call that a write operation from the process that triggered
the watchpoint to the one watching it. Like a signal. Signals have a
rudimentary DAC policy (write only to the same UID) that could be
your model.

I'm not sure signals are a good comparison.

They can affect a process in significant ways whereas triggering
a notification is less invasive so the security requirements
should take that into consideration.

But there is a problem here I think.

How about the case where a user name space is created or entered
without a newly created mount name space and mounts and umounts
are done, the user name space necessarily expects the table of
mounts it sees to be up to date.

But, if the methods here are used by user space, say libmount
was updated to use it, to gain the efficiency of not constantly
re-reading the proc mount table then restrictions on notifications
would mean the mount table seen in the user name space might not
be updated and would no longer be correct.

The converse is more interesting, where the user name space does
create or enter a new mount name space, then libmount would see ???,
probably not the updated mount information ... unless it opens a
new file handle to get mount update information ... a long running
daemon that uses libmount and dispenses or uses mount information
would very likely have a problem ...

The current proc file system method or providing the mount table
forces a new file handle to be opened whenever getting the mount
table so it always sees only the current mount name space mount
table.

At the very least I need to think more about this ...

quoted

But for each event, I can associate an object label, derived from the
source,
and use f_cred on the notification queue to provide a subject label.

... or UID or groups.

quoted

quoted

quoted

 (2) Superblocks EIO, ENOSPC and EDQUOT events (not complete yet).

Here, too. If SELinux (for example) policy says you can't see
anything on a filesystem you shouldn't get notifications about
things that happen to that filesystem.

Yep.  Sounds like I need to refer that to the LSM as above.

It's a bit easier for specifically nominated sb sources since you might only
need to do the check once at sb_notify() time.  If there's a general queue
that all sbs contribute to, however, then things become more complicated as
the checks have to be done at do-we-write-into-this-queue? time.

quoted

quoted

 (3) Key/keyring changes events

And again, I should only get notifications about keys and
keyrings I have access to.

Currently, you can only watch keys that grant you View permission, which
might
suffice.

That seems appropriate.

quoted

quoted

I expect that you intentionally left off

   (4) User injected events

at this point, but it's an obvious extension. That is going
to require access controls (remember kdbus) so I think you'd
do well to design them in now rather than have some security
module hack like me come along later and "fix" it. 

Yeah - the thought had occurred to me, but there needs to be some way to
define a 'source' and a way to connect them.  Also, would you want a general
source that anyone can contribute through, specific sources where you have
to
directly connect or namespace-restricted sources?

My guess is that the consensus would be "Yes" to all the above.

quoted

David

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html