[PATCH] general protection fault in sock_has_perm
From: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org (Greg KH)
Date: 2018-02-01 08:18:11
Also in:
lkml, selinux, stable
On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 04:06:37AM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
On Tue, Jan 30, 2018 at 5:46 PM, Greg KH [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Tue, Jan 30, 2018 at 11:00:04AM -0800, Mark Salyzyn wrote:quoted
On 01/19/2018 09:41 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:quoted
If we can't safely dereference the sock in these hooks, then that seems to point back to the approach used in my original code, where in ancient history I had sock_has_perm() take the socket and use its inode i_security field instead of the sock. commit 253bfae6e0ad97554799affa0266052968a45808 switched them to use the sock instead.Because of the nature of this problem (hard to duplicate, no clear path), I am understandably not comfortable reverting and submitting for testing in order to prove this point. It is disruptive because it changes several subroutine call signatures. AFAIK this looks like a user request racing in without reference counting or RCU grace period in the callers (could be viewed as not an issue with security code). Effectively fixed in 4.9-stable, but broken in 4.4-stable. hygiene, KISS and small, is all I do feel comfortable to submit to 4.4-stable without pulling in all the infrastructure improvements. -- Mark --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 34427384605d..be68992a28cb 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c@@ -4066,6 +4066,8 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task,struct sock *sk, u32 perms) struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; u32 tsid = task_sid(task); + if (!sksec) + return -EFAULT; if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) return 0;This looks sane to me as a simple 4.4-only fix. If the SELinux maintainer acks it, I can easily queue this up.This revision addresses my concerns with Mark's previous patch. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Wonderful! Mark, can you resend this in a format I can apply it in? thanks, greg k-h -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html