On 01/19/2018 09:41 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:

quoted

If we can't safely dereference the sock in these hooks, then that seems
to point back to the approach used in my original code, where in
ancient history I had sock_has_perm() take the socket and use its inode
i_security field instead of the sock.  commit
253bfae6e0ad97554799affa0266052968a45808 switched them to use the sock
instead.

Because of the nature of this problem (hard to duplicate, no clear path), I
am understandably not comfortable reverting and submitting for testing in
order to prove this point. It is disruptive because it changes several
subroutine call signatures.

AFAIK this looks like a user request racing in without reference counting or
RCU grace period in the callers (could be viewed as not an issue with
security code). Effectively fixed in 4.9-stable, but broken in 4.4-stable.

hygiene, KISS and small, is all I do feel comfortable to submit to
4.4-stable without pulling in all the infrastructure improvements.

-- Mark

---
?security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++
?1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 34427384605d..be68992a28cb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c

@@ -4066,6 +4066,8 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task,

struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
???? struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
???? u32 tsid = task_sid(task);

+??? if (!sksec)
+??? ??? return -EFAULT;
???? if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
???? ??? return 0;