[PATCH V4 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
From: Kees Cook <hidden>
Date: 2017-09-08 18:18:00
On Mon, Sep 4, 2017 at 11:46 PM, Richard Guy Briggs [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
Introduce inline root_privileged() to make use of SECURE_NONROOT easier to read. Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <redacted> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <redacted> --- security/commoncap.c | 9 +++++---- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 623f251..1904f49 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c@@ -472,14 +472,14 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_f return rc; } +static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); } + static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid) { const struct cred *old = current_cred(); struct cred *new = bprm->cred; - if (issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) - return;
Seems like it'd be better to just leave this check here (with the new inline name). But if there's no v5, then consider it: Acked-by: Kees Cook <redacted> -Kees
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
/* * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it@@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0); - handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid); + if (root_privileged()) + handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid); /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))@@ -602,7 +603,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) { if (!__cap_full(effective, new) || !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || - issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { + !root_privileged()) { ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); if (ret < 0) return ret; --1.7.1
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