Thread (30 messages) 30 messages, 4 authors, 2017-09-20

[PATCH V4 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic

From: Kees Cook <hidden>
Date: 2017-09-08 18:18:00

On Mon, Sep 4, 2017 at 11:46 PM, Richard Guy Briggs [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
Introduce inline root_privileged() to make use of SECURE_NONROOT
easier to read.

Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <redacted>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <redacted>
---
 security/commoncap.c |    9 +++++----
 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 623f251..1904f49 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -472,14 +472,14 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_f
        return rc;
 }

+static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); }
+
 static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
                                   bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
 {
        const struct cred *old = current_cred();
        struct cred *new = bprm->cred;

-       if (issecure(SECURE_NOROOT))
-               return;
Seems like it'd be better to just leave this check here (with the new
inline name). But if there's no v5, then consider it:

Acked-by: Kees Cook <redacted>

-Kees
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
        /*
         * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
         * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user.  Do set it
@@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)

        root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);

-       handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
+       if (root_privileged())
+               handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);

        /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
        if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
@@ -602,7 +603,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
        if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) {
                if (!__cap_full(effective, new) ||
                    !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
-                   issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
+                   !root_privileged()) {
                        ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
                        if (ret < 0)
                                return ret;
--
1.7.1


-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
--
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