[PATCH V4 03/10] capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap

---
 security/commoncap.c |   20 ++++++++++----------
 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index cf6e2b0..623f251 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c

@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
                                          struct linux_binprm *bprm,
                                          bool *effective,
-                                         bool *has_cap)
+                                         bool *has_fcap)
 {
        struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
        unsigned i;

@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
                *effective = true;

        if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)
-               *has_cap = true;
+               *has_fcap = true;

        CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
                __u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];

@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
  * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
  * constructed by execve().
  */
-static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap)
+static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
 {
        int rc = 0;
        struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;

@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
                goto out;
        }

-       rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap);
+       rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap);
        if (rc == -EINVAL)
                printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
                       __func__, rc, bprm->filename);

@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
        return rc;
 }

-static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
+static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
                                   bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
 {
        const struct cred *old = current_cred();

@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
         * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user.  Do set it
         * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
         */
-       if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
+       if (has_fcap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
                warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
                return;
        }

@@ -523,20 +523,20 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
        const struct cred *old = current_cred();
        struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
-       bool effective = false, has_cap = false, is_setid;
+       bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid;
        int ret;
        kuid_t root_uid;

        if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
                return -EPERM;

-       ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
+       ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap);
        if (ret < 0)
                return ret;

        root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);

-       handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
+       handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);

        /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
        if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))

@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
        new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;

        /* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */
-       if (has_cap || is_setid)
+       if (has_fcap || is_setid)
                cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);

        /*
--

1.7.1