out of tree lsm's
From: Peter Moody <hidden>
Date: 2017-03-21 16:06:53
On Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 8:36 AM, Casey Schaufler [off-list ref] wrote:
On 3/21/2017 3:41 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:quoted
Tetsuo Handa wrote:quoted
Casey Schaufler wrote:quoted
quoted
right. sorry for the imprecise language; by site-specific I meant a "small" lsm. I would love to have the ability write a small lsm that I can build as a module and load at boot eg. via initrd. AIUI, adding even a new "small" lsm requires kconfig patches, building a new kernel, etc. I know there are objections to dynamically loadable lsms and I was trying to find a compromise that made them easier to work with.The stacking design criteria I'm working with include not doing anything that would prevent dynamic module loading. I do not plan to implement dynamic loading. Tetsuo has been a strong advocate of loadable modules. I would expect to see a proposal from him shortly after the general stacking lands, assuming it does.But currently __lsm_ro_after_init which is planned to go to 4.12 is preventing dynamic modules from loading. We need a legitimate interface for loadable modules like http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201702152342.GBH04183.FOFJFHQOLMOtVS at I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp . Requiring rodata=0 kernel command line option to allow dynamic modules is silly.I think we need something like below change when allowing loadable modules.I believe that a simpler approach would be to add a separate list of dynamic hooks to supliment the list of static hooks. If SELinux unloading is desired the SELinux hooks would be put on the dynamic list which would not be "hardened" with _ro_after_init, where the rest of the static modules would be.
FWIW, I don't know if that would solve the case I was initially asking about since the out-of-tree lsm I was hoping to be able to access all of the standard security hooks with an out-of-tree module. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html