out of tree lsm's
From: penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp (Tetsuo Handa)
Date: 2017-03-21 10:41:37
Subsystem:
apparmor security module, capabilities, loadpin security module, security subsystem, selinux security module, smack security module, the rest, tomoyo security module, yama security module · Maintainers:
John Johansen, Serge Hallyn, Kees Cook, Paul Moore, James Morris, "Serge E. Hallyn", Stephen Smalley, Casey Schaufler, Linus Torvalds, Kentaro Takeda, Tetsuo Handa
Tetsuo Handa wrote:
Casey Schaufler wrote:quoted
quoted
right. sorry for the imprecise language; by site-specific I meant a "small" lsm. I would love to have the ability write a small lsm that I can build as a module and load at boot eg. via initrd. AIUI, adding even a new "small" lsm requires kconfig patches, building a new kernel, etc. I know there are objections to dynamically loadable lsms and I was trying to find a compromise that made them easier to work with.The stacking design criteria I'm working with include not doing anything that would prevent dynamic module loading. I do not plan to implement dynamic loading. Tetsuo has been a strong advocate of loadable modules. I would expect to see a proposal from him shortly after the general stacking lands, assuming it does.But currently __lsm_ro_after_init which is planned to go to 4.12 is preventing dynamic modules from loading. We need a legitimate interface for loadable modules like http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201702152342.GBH04183.FOFJFHQOLMOtVS at I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp . Requiring rodata=0 kernel command line option to allow dynamic modules is silly.
I think we need something like below change when allowing loadable modules.
From b81fbc7c9c052c92f842777428bee2d5942ce9a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2017 14:37:52 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] security: Make dynamic module registration legitimate.
While we are waiting for stacking support of in-tree built-in LSM modules
(and therefore I am refraining from proposing changes for supporting
dynamically loadable LSM modules), commit dd0859dccbe291cf ("security:
introduce CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS") and commit ca97d939db114c8d
("security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_init") came in. But these two
commits are preventing us from making it possible to legitimately support
dynamically loadable LSM modules due to lack of architecture-independent
infrastructure for temporarily making LSM hooks writable.
This patch demonstrates how we can make it possible to legitimately support
dynamically loadable LSM modules by using set_memory_ro()/set_memory_nx()/
set_memory_rw() infrastructure rather than __ro_after_init marking.
Below is an example output for registration and runtime disablement of
SELinux by this patch. pr_info() in this patch is only for testing purpose
and will be removed in the final version.
----------
[ 0.014039] Security Framework initialized
[ 0.015006] Allocating LSM hooks for capability at ffff88013a10a000
[ 0.016003] Yama: becoming mindful.
[ 0.017008] Allocating LSM hooks for yama at ffff88013a10b000
[ 0.018006] LoadPin: ready to pin (currently disabled)
[ 0.018009] Allocating LSM hooks for loadpin at ffff88013a10c000
[ 0.020004] SELinux: Initializing.
[ 0.021016] Allocating LSM hooks for selinux at ffff88013a114000
[ 0.022005] AppArmor: AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter
[ 0.023002] Marking LSM hook heads at ffffffff81853000 read only and non execute.
[ 0.024025] Marking LSM hooks for capability at ffff88013a10a000 read only and non execute.
[ 0.025730] Marking LSM hooks for yama at ffff88013a10b000 read only and non execute.
[ 0.026007] Marking LSM hooks for loadpin at ffff88013a10c000 read only and non execute.
[ 0.027007] Marking LSM hooks for selinux at ffff88013a114000 read only and non execute.
[ 0.028140] Dentry cache hash table entries: 524288 (order: 10, 4194304 bytes)
(...snipped...)
[ 5.069577] SELinux: Disabled at runtime.
[ 5.076575] Marking LSM hooks for capability at ffff88013a10a000 read write.
[ 5.087069] Marking LSM hooks for yama at ffff88013a10b000 read write.
[ 5.096963] Marking LSM hooks for loadpin at ffff88013a10c000 read write.
[ 5.104957] Marking LSM hooks for selinux at ffff88013a114000 read write.
[ 5.109179] Marking LSM hook heads at ffffffff81853000 read write.
[ 5.112881] Marking LSM hook heads at ffffffff81853000 read only and non execute.
[ 5.117276] Marking LSM hooks for capability at ffff88013a10a000 read only and non execute.
[ 5.122347] Marking LSM hooks for yama at ffff88013a10b000 read only and non execute.
[ 5.126936] Marking LSM hooks for loadpin at ffff88013a10c000 read only and non execute.
[ 5.149116] audit: type=1404 audit(1490064154.351:2): selinux=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295
----------
This patch mainly does the following things.
(1) Use set_memory_ro()/set_memory_nx() instead of __ro_after_init
so that runtime disablement of SELinux and runtime enablement of
dynamically loadable LSMs can use set_memory_rw().
While x86 architecture provides lookup_address() for finding
"struct page" from virtual address which allows us to temporarily
make specific pages writable, other architectures which support
CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX feature which __ro_after_init depends on
(e.g. arm, parisc, s390) do not provide it.
But set_memory_ro()/set_memory_nx()/set_memory_rw() are already
available in x86, arm and s390. I don't know whether parisc can
implement set_memory_xx() but I assume it is possible. Therefore,
I assume that set_memory_xx() will support wider environments than
__ro_after_init while allowing runtime disablement of SELinux and
runtime enablement of dynamically loadable LSMs until we get
architecture-independent infrastructure for temporarily making LSM
hooks writable.
(2) Make "struct security_hook_list" variable in each LSM module
read-only by copying the content of that variable to dynamically
allocated (and protected via set_memory_ro()/set_memory_nx())
memory pages upon registration.
(3) Add EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_add_hooks) in order to legitimately
support dynamically loadable LSMs.
(4) Replace "struct security_hook_list"->head with
"struct security_hook_list"->offset so that
"struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;" can become
a local variable in security/security.c .
This patch applies on top of reverting the two commits mentioned above.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 34 +++++++-------
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +-
security/commoncap.c | 2 +-
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 ++++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 2 +-
9 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index e29d4c6..668157f 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h@@ -1857,7 +1857,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads { struct list_head audit_rule_match; struct list_head audit_rule_free; #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ -}; +} __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); /* * Security module hook list structure.
@@ -1865,9 +1865,16 @@ struct security_hook_heads { */ struct security_hook_list { struct list_head list; - struct list_head *head; union security_list_options hook; - char *lsm; + const char *lsm; + unsigned int offset; +}; + +struct lsm_entry { + struct list_head head; + unsigned int order; + unsigned int count; + struct security_hook_list hooks[0]; }; /*
@@ -1877,14 +1884,14 @@ struct security_hook_list { * text involved. */ #define LSM_HOOK_INIT(HEAD, HOOK) \ - { .head = &security_hook_heads.HEAD, .hook = { .HEAD = HOOK } } + { .offset = offsetof(struct security_hook_heads, HEAD), \ + .hook = { .HEAD = HOOK } } -extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads; extern char *lsm_names; -extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, - char *lsm); - +extern struct lsm_entry *security_add_hooks(const struct security_hook_list * + hooks, const unsigned int count, + const char *lsm); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE /* * Assuring the safety of deleting a security module is up to
@@ -1898,15 +1905,8 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, * disabling their module is a good idea needs to be at least as * careful as the SELinux team. */ -static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, - int count) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) - list_del_rcu(&hooks[i].list); -} -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE */ +extern void security_delete_hooks(struct lsm_entry *entry); +#endif extern int __init security_module_enable(const char *module); extern void __init capability_add_hooks(void);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 709eacd..04cf323 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, return error; } -static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = { +static const struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __initconst = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 78b3783..c456805 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY -struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] = { +static const struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __initconst = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable), LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, cap_ptrace_access_check),
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 1d82eae..b88154a 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) return 0; } -static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] = { +static const struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __initconst = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file), };
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d0e07f2..9cb2b3e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ /* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */ #define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10 +static bool lsm_initialized __ro_after_init; char *lsm_names; /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
@@ -47,6 +48,59 @@ static void __init do_security_initcalls(void) } } +static struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); +static LIST_HEAD(lsm_entry_list); +#if defined(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX) && !defined(CONFIG_PARISC) +static inline void mark_security_hooks_ro(void) +{ + struct lsm_entry *tmp; + void *addr; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(security_hook_heads) % PAGE_SIZE); + BUILD_BUG_ON(!PAGE_ALIGNED(&security_hook_heads)); + pr_info("Marking LSM hook heads@%p read only and non execute.\n", + &security_hook_heads); + addr = page_address(virt_to_page(&security_hook_heads)); + set_memory_ro((unsigned long) addr, + sizeof(security_hook_heads) >> PAGE_SHIFT); + set_memory_nx((unsigned long) addr, + sizeof(security_hook_heads) >> PAGE_SHIFT); + list_for_each_entry(tmp, &lsm_entry_list, head) { + pr_info("Marking LSM hooks for %s at %p read only and non execute.\n", + tmp->hooks[0].lsm, tmp); + addr = page_address(virt_to_head_page(tmp)); + set_memory_ro((unsigned long) addr, 1 << tmp->order); + set_memory_nx((unsigned long) addr, 1 << tmp->order); + } +} + +static inline void mark_security_hooks_rw(void) +{ + struct lsm_entry *tmp; + void *addr; + + list_for_each_entry(tmp, &lsm_entry_list, head) { + pr_info("Marking LSM hooks for %s at %p read write.\n", + tmp->hooks[0].lsm, tmp); + addr = page_address(virt_to_head_page(tmp)); + set_memory_rw((unsigned long) addr, 1 << tmp->order); + } + pr_info("Marking LSM hook heads at %p read write.\n", + &security_hook_heads); + addr = page_address(virt_to_page(&security_hook_heads)); + set_memory_rw((unsigned long) addr, + sizeof(security_hook_heads) >> PAGE_SHIFT); +} +#else +static inline void mark_security_hooks_ro(void) +{ +} + +static inline void mark_security_hooks_rw(void) +{ +} +#endif + /** * security_init - initializes the security framework *
@@ -68,6 +122,8 @@ int __init security_init(void) */ do_security_initcalls(); + lsm_initialized = true; + mark_security_hooks_ro(); return 0; }
@@ -79,7 +135,7 @@ static int __init choose_lsm(char *str) } __setup("security=", choose_lsm); -static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result) +static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) { char *cp;
@@ -122,18 +178,60 @@ int __init security_module_enable(const char *module) * * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure. */ -void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, - char *lsm) +struct lsm_entry *security_add_hooks(const struct security_hook_list *hooks, + const unsigned int count, const char *lsm) { int i; + /* + * entry has to be an PAGE_ALIGNED multiple of PAGE_SIZE memory + * in order to pass to set_memory_ro()/set_memory_nx()/set_memory_rw(). + */ + const size_t size = sizeof(*hooks) * count + sizeof(struct lsm_entry); + const unsigned int order = get_order(size); + struct lsm_entry *entry = kmalloc_order(size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, + order); + if (!entry || !PAGE_ALIGNED(entry) || lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0) { + kfree(entry); + goto out; + } + if (lsm_initialized) + mark_security_hooks_rw(); + pr_info("Allocating LSM hooks for %s@%p\n", lsm, entry); + entry->order = order; + entry->count = count; + memcpy(&entry->hooks[0], hooks, size - sizeof(struct lsm_entry)); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - hooks[i].lsm = lsm; - list_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); + entry->hooks[i].lsm = lsm; + list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->hooks[i].list, (struct list_head *) + (((char *) &security_hook_heads) + + entry->hooks[i].offset)); } - if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0) + list_add_tail(&entry->head, &lsm_entry_list); + if (lsm_initialized) + mark_security_hooks_ro(); + return entry; + out: + if (!lsm_initialized) panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__); + return NULL; +} +/* Enable this when we start supporting loadable LSM modules.*/ +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_add_hooks); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE +void security_delete_hooks(struct lsm_entry *entry) +{ + int i; + + mark_security_hooks_rw(); + list_del_rcu(&entry->head); + for (i = 0; i < entry->count; i++) + list_del_rcu(&entry->hooks[i].list); + /* Not calling kfree() in order to avoid races. */ + mark_security_hooks_ro(); } +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE */ /* * Hook list operation macros.
@@ -1622,7 +1720,7 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule, } #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ -struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = { +static struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = { .binder_set_context_mgr = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_set_context_mgr), .binder_transaction =
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 0c2ac31..6fa68d9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c@@ -6108,7 +6108,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #endif -static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = { +static const struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __initconst = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
@@ -6323,6 +6323,10 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #endif }; +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE +static struct lsm_entry *selinux_entry; +#endif + static __init int selinux_init(void) { if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
@@ -6350,7 +6354,11 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); avc_init(); - security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux"); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE + selinux_entry = +#endif + security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), + "selinux"); if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)) panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
@@ -6479,7 +6487,7 @@ int selinux_disable(void) selinux_disabled = 1; selinux_enabled = 0; - security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks)); + security_delete_hooks(selinux_entry); /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */ avc_disable();
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index fc8fb31..fbc86a3 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c@@ -4633,7 +4633,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) return 0; } -static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = { +static const struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __initconst = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme), LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index edc52d6..74ef461 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ static int tomoyo_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for * registering TOMOYO. */ -static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] = { +static const struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] __initconst = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, tomoyo_cred_prepare), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, tomoyo_cred_transfer),
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 88271a3..6e1cb40 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) return rc; } -static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] = { +static const struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __initconst = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, yama_task_prctl),
--
1.8.3.1
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