Re: [PATCH 3/9] security: keys: trusted: Parse out individual components of the key blob
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Date: 2021-02-24 17:23:56
Also in:
keyrings, linux-integrity, lkml
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Date: 2021-02-24 17:23:56
Also in:
keyrings, linux-integrity, lkml
On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 07:36:27AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
On Sat, Feb 20, 2021 at 05:05:36AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:quoted
On Sat, Feb 20, 2021 at 01:32:49AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:quoted
Performing any sort of state validation of a sealed TPM blob requires being able to access the individual members in the response. Parse the blob sufficiently to be able to stash pointers to each member, along with the length. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <redacted>I'll just say LGTM for now. Did not see anything obviously wrong in the code change (and does make sense to nitpick minor things just yet). Need to understand the whole use case just a little bit better.I wrote this up with some more detail at https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/55845.html - it seemed longer than appropriate for a commit message, but if you'd like more detail somewhere I can certainly add it.
Thanks (bookmarked). I'll read it before reviewing +1 version. Requiring a config flag is something that slows down adoption in the stock kernels. Since we are talking about hibernate the decision whether to have this feature set, does not have to be something that needs to be changed dynamically to a running system. So: maybe the best compromise would be to have it kernel command line option? That way it's easier feature to adapt (e.g. with GRUB configuration) and to enable in the kernel. /Jarkko