Re: [PATCH 4/9] security: keys: trusted: Store the handle of a loaded key
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Date: 2021-02-20 03:07:53
Also in:
keyrings, linux-integrity, lkml
On Sat, Feb 20, 2021 at 01:32:50AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
Certain in-kernel operations using a trusted key (such as creation certification) require knowledge of the handle it's loaded at. Keep a copy of that in the payload. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <redacted>
This looks good to me as well *as a code change*. /Jarkko
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
--- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index 020e01a99ea4..154d8a1769c3 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct trusted_key_payload { struct rcu_head rcu; + unsigned int blob_handle; unsigned int key_len; unsigned int blob_len; unsigned int creation_len;diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 6357a51a24e9..a3673fffd834 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c@@ -272,11 +272,13 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, } rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); - if (!rc) + if (!rc) { *blob_handle = be32_to_cpup( (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); - else + payload->blob_handle = *blob_handle; + } else { goto out; + } rc = tpm2_unpack_blob(payload); out:-- 2.30.0.617.g56c4b15f3c-goog