Thread (77 messages) 77 messages, 12 authors, 2011-05-29

Re: [PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call filtering

From: Ingo Molnar <hidden>
Date: 2011-05-17 13:10:58
Also in: linux-arm-kernel, linuxppc-dev

* James Morris [off-list ref] wrote:
On Mon, 16 May 2011, Ingo Molnar wrote:
quoted
quoted
Not really.

Firstly, what is the security goal of these restrictions? [...]
To do what i described above? Namely:

 " Sandboxed code should only be allowed to open files in /home/sandbox/, /lib/
   and /usr/lib/ "
These are access rules, they don't really describe a high-level security 
goal. [...]
Restrictng sandboxed code to only open files within a given VFS namespace 
boundary sure sounds like a high-level security goal to me.

If implemented and set up correctly then it restricts sandboxed code to only be 
able to open files reachable via that VFS sub-namespace.

That is a rather meaningful high-level concept. What higher level concept do 
you want to argue?
[...]  How do you know it's ok to open everything in these directories?
How do you know it's ok to open /etc/hosts? The sysadmin has configured the 
system that way.

How do you know that it's ok for sandboxed code to open files in 
/home/sandbox/? The sandbox developer has configured the system that way.

I'm not sure i get your point.

Thanks,

	Ingo
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