Re: [PATCH v4 2/5] IMA: block writes of the security.ima xattr with unsupported algorithms
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Date: 2021-07-28 12:43:48
Hi Simon, On Wed, 2021-07-28 at 07:00 +0000, THOBY Simon wrote:
quoted
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+ + if (likely(dentry_hash == ima_hash_algo + || crypto_has_alg(hash_algo_name[dentry_hash], 0, 0))) + return 0; + + pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); + /* no memory available ? no file path for you */The comment here is unnecessary. Avoid or limit comments inside a function. Refer to the section "8) Commenting" in Documentation/process/coding-style.rstquoted
+ if (pathbuf) + path = dentry_path(dentry, pathbuf, PATH_MAX); + + /* disallow xattr writes with algorithms not built in the kernel */ + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, d_inode(dentry), + path, "collect_data", "unavailable-hash-algorithm", res, 0);This will emit an audit message without the filename when !path. Is this what you intended?This is what I was clumsily trying to explain in the previous comment: if we cannot allocate memory for a file path, I thought it best to log the audit message without the path than fail with a -ENOMEM (auditing will also try to allocate a memory buffer too, but a bit smaller, and memory could have been reclaimed between the two calls, so the auditing operation may succeed). Of course I could also return -ENOMEM, and it would happily propagate back to the user. What do you think ?
Memory pressure isn't the reason for preventing the xattr write. It's the reason for not being able to audit the setxattr failure. thanks, Mimi