Re: possible deadlock in start_this_handle (2)
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Date: 2021-02-11 12:57:48
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linux-mm, lkml
On Thu 11-02-21 13:10:20, Jan Kara wrote:
On Thu 11-02-21 12:28:48, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:quoted
On Thu, Feb 11, 2021 at 12:22 PM Dmitry Vyukov [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Thu, Feb 11, 2021 at 11:49 AM Jan Kara [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
Hello, added mm guys to CC. On Wed 10-02-21 05:35:18, syzbot wrote:quoted
HEAD commit: 1e0d27fc Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew) git tree: upstream console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=15cbce90d00000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=bd1f72220b2e57eb dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=bfdded10ab7dcd7507ae userspace arch: i386 Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet. IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: Reported-by: syzbot+bfdded10ab7dcd7507ae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.11.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/2246 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888041a988e0 (jbd2_handle){++++}-{0:0}, at: start_this_handle+0xf81/0x1380 fs/jbd2/transaction.c:444 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8be892c0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x0/0x30 mm/page_alloc.c:5195 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: __fs_reclaim_acquire mm/page_alloc.c:4326 [inline] fs_reclaim_acquire+0x117/0x150 mm/page_alloc.c:4340 might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:193 [inline] slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:493 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2817 [inline] __kmalloc_node+0x5f/0x430 mm/slub.c:4015 kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:575 [inline] kvmalloc_node+0x61/0xf0 mm/util.c:587 kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:781 [inline] ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find fs/ext4/xattr.c:1465 [inline] ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create fs/ext4/xattr.c:1508 [inline] ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x1ce6/0x3780 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1649 ext4_xattr_ibody_set+0x78/0x2b0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2224 ext4_xattr_set_handle+0x8f4/0x13e0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2380 ext4_xattr_set+0x13a/0x340 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2493 ext4_xattr_user_set+0xbc/0x100 fs/ext4/xattr_user.c:40 __vfs_setxattr+0x10e/0x170 fs/xattr.c:177 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x11a/0x4c0 fs/xattr.c:208 __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x1bf/0x250 fs/xattr.c:266 vfs_setxattr+0x135/0x320 fs/xattr.c:291 setxattr+0x1ff/0x290 fs/xattr.c:553 path_setxattr+0x170/0x190 fs/xattr.c:572 __do_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:587 [inline] __se_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:583 [inline] __ia32_sys_setxattr+0xbc/0x150 fs/xattr.c:583 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:77 [inline] __do_fast_syscall_32+0x56/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:139 do_fast_syscall_32+0x2f/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:164 entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x4d/0x5cThis stacktrace should never happen. ext4_xattr_set() starts a transaction. That internally goes through start_this_handle() which calls: handle->saved_alloc_context = memalloc_nofs_save(); and we restore the allocation context only in stop_this_handle() when stopping the handle. And with this fs_reclaim_acquire() should remove __GFP_FS from the mask and not call __fs_reclaim_acquire(). Now I have no idea why something here didn't work out. Given we don't have a reproducer it will be probably difficult to debug this. I'd note that about year and half ago similar report happened (got autoclosed) so it may be something real somewhere but it may also be just some HW glitch or something like that.HW glitch is theoretically possible. But if we are considering such causes, I would say a kernel memory corruption is way more likely, we have hundreds of known memory-corruption-capable bugs open. In most cases they are caught by KASAN before doing silent damage. But KASAN can miss some cases. I see at least 4 existing bugs with similar stack: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=bfdded10ab7dcd7507ae https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a7ab8df042baaf42ae3c https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=c814a55a728493959328551c769ede4c8ff72aab https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=426ad9adca053dafcd698f3a48ad5406dccc972b All in all, I would not assume it's a memory corruption. When we had bugs that actually caused silent memory corruption, that caused a spike of random one-time crashes all over the kernel. This does not look like it.I wonder if memalloc_nofs_save (or any other manipulation of current->flags) could have been invoked from interrupt context? I think it could cause the failure mode we observe (extremely rare disappearing flags). It may be useful to add a check for task context there.That's an interesting idea. I'm not sure if anything does manipulate current->flags from inside an interrupt (definitely memalloc_nofs_save() doesn't seem to be) but I'd think that in fully preemtible kernel, scheduler could preempt the task inside memalloc_nofs_save() and the current->flags manipulation could also clash with a manipulation of these flags by the scheduler if there's any?
current->flags should be always manipulated from the user context. But who knows maybe there is a bug and some interrupt handler is calling it. This should be easy to catch no? -- Michal Hocko SUSE Labs