Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of
making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered
untrusted".

Suggested-by: Vineeth Pillai <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Fabio M. De Francesco <redacted>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
index 7b410aef9c5c..e6b5ceb219ec 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst

@@ -181,10 +181,11 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve
 --------------------------------------------------------
 1. For MDS
 ~~~~~~~~~~
-Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in
-user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks
-which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such
-attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
+Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings running in
+user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all siblings run tasks
+which trust each other, when the kernel is executing code on behalf of a task, it
+cannot trust the code running in the sibling. Such attacks are possible for any
+combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).