Re: [PATCH] admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst
From: Joel Fernandes <hidden>
Date: 2021-07-23 04:38:46
Also in:
lkml
On Wed, Jul 21, 2021 at 3:02 PM Fabio M. De Francesco [off-list ref] wrote:
Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered untrusted". Suggested-by: Vineeth Pillai <redacted> Signed-off-by: Fabio M. De Francesco <redacted>
Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <redacted> thanks, - Joel
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst index 7b410aef9c5c..e6b5ceb219ec 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst@@ -181,10 +181,11 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve -------------------------------------------------------- 1. For MDS ~~~~~~~~~~ -Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in -user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks -which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such -attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode). +Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings running in +user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all siblings run tasks +which trust each other, when the kernel is executing code on behalf of a task, it +cannot trust the code running in the sibling. Such attacks are possible for any +combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode). 2. For L1TF ~~~~~~~~~~~ --2.32.0