Thread (42 messages) 42 messages, 10 authors, 2021-06-25
STALE1803d LANDED
Revisions (2)
  1. v1 [diff vs current]
  2. v2 current

[PATCH v2 04/29] docs: admin-guide: hw-vuln: avoid using ReST :doc:`foo` markup

From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Date: 2021-06-16 06:27:53
Also in: lkml
Subsystem: documentation, the rest, x86 hardware vulnerabilities · Maintainers: Jonathan Corbet, Linus Torvalds, Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov, Peter Zijlstra, Josh Poimboeuf

The :doc:`foo` tag is auto-generated via automarkup.py.
So, use the filename at the sources, instead of :doc:`foo`.

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
---
 .../hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst          | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
index 3b1ce68d2456..966c9b3296ea 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
 SRBDS - Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
 =============================================
 
-SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS :doc:`mds` techniques to
+SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS
+Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst techniques to
 infer values returned from special register accesses.  Special register
 accesses are accesses to off core registers.  According to Intel's evaluation,
 the special register reads that have a security expectation of privacy are
-- 
2.31.1
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