Thread (36 messages) 36 messages, 12 authors, 2021-04-02

Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Date: 2021-04-01 06:04:23
Also in: keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity, linux-security-module, lkml

On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 08:50:05AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 12:11:32PM +1100, Herbert Xu wrote:
quoted
On Wed, Mar 31, 2021 at 04:34:29PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
quoted
On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 02:31:46AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
quoted
It's a bummer but uapi is the god in the end. Since TPM does not do it
today, that behaviour must be supported forever. That's why a boot option
AND a warning would be the best compromise.
It's not UAPI if there is no way for userspace to tell if it changed.
Exactly.  UAPI is only an issue if something *breaks*.
If there's even one user that comes shouting that he has a user space
configuration, where e.g. rng entropy is consumed constantly and the
code assumes that trusted keys does not add to that, then something
would break.

It would be a crap user space yes, but I don't want to go on reverting
because of that. I think there is small but still existing chance that
something could break.
random.c no longer provides any interfaces that subtract entropy credits, as
that was never something that made sense.  So "consuming" all the entropy from
random.c isn't a thing anymore.
Why not just add a boot parameter instead of making brutal enforcing
changes, indirectly visible to the user space?
Why not just fix this bug instead of providing an option to fix it that everyone
will need to remember to provide?

- Eric
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