On Fri, 2021-04-09 at 14:56 -0400, Simo Sorce wrote:

Hi Jason,
I can't speak for Hangbin, we do not work for the same company and I
was not aware of his efforts until this patch landed.

Turns out I and Hangbin do work for the same company after all.
Left hand is meeting right hand internally now. :-D
The comments still stand of course.

Simo.

For my part we were already looking at big_key, wireguard and other
areas internally, but were not thinking of sending upstream patches
like these w/o first a good assessment with our teams and lab that they
were proper and sufficient.

quoted

 So
I think either you should send an exhaustive patch series that forbids
all use of non-FIPS crypto anywhere in the kernel (another example:
net/core/secure_seq.c) in addition to all tunneling modules that don't
use FIPS-certified crypto, or figure out how to disable the lib/crypto
primitives that you want to be disabled in "fips mode". With a
coherent patchset for either of these, we can then evaluate it.

Yes a cohesive approach would be ideal, but I do not know if pushing
substantially the same checks we have in the Crypto API down to
lib/crypto is the right way to go, I am not oppose but I guess Herbert
would have to chime in here.

-- 
Simo Sorce
RHEL Crypto Team
Red Hat, Inc