Re: [PATCH Part1 v5 28/38] x86/compressed/64: enable SEV-SNP-validated CPUID in #VC handler
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Date: 2021-08-25 19:18:53
Also in:
kvm, linux-efi, linux-mm, lkml, platform-driver-x86
On Fri, Aug 20, 2021 at 10:19:23AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
From: Michael Roth <redacted> CPUID instructions generate a #VC exception for SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guests, for which early handlers are currently set up to handle. In the case of SEV-SNP, guests can use a special location in guest memory address space that has been pre-populated with firmware-validated CPUID information to look up the relevant CPUID values rather than requesting them from hypervisor via a VMGEXIT. Determine the location of the CPUID memory address in advance of any CPUID instructions/exceptions and, when available, use it to handle the CPUID lookup. Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <redacted> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <redacted> --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c | 1 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 1 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c | 7 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 1 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 374 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 4 + 9 files changed, 394 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Another huuge patch. I wonder if it can be split...
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c index 16ff5cb9a1fb..a1529a230ea7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c@@ -176,3 +176,4 @@ efi_get_conf_table(struct boot_params *boot_params, return 0; } +
Applying: x86/compressed/64: Enable SEV-SNP-validated CPUID in #VC handler .git/rebase-apply/patch:21: new blank line at EOF. + warning: 1 line adds whitespace errors. That looks like a stray hunk which doesn't belong.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S index a2347ded77ea..1c1658693fc9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S@@ -441,6 +441,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_64) .Lon_kernel_cs: pushq %rsi + movq %rsi, %rdi /* real mode address */ call load_stage1_idt popq %rsidiff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c index 9b93567d663a..1f6511a6625d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include <asm/segment.h> #include <asm/trapnr.h> #include "misc.h" +#include <asm/sev.h>
asm/ namespaced headers should go together, before the private ones, i.e., above the misc.h line.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
static void set_idt_entry(int vector, void (*handler)(void)) {@@ -28,13 +29,15 @@ static void load_boot_idt(const struct desc_ptr *dtr) } /* Setup IDT before kernel jumping to .Lrelocated */ -void load_stage1_idt(void) +void load_stage1_idt(void *rmode) { boot_idt_desc.address = (unsigned long)boot_idt; - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { + sev_snp_cpuid_init(rmode); set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_VC, boot_stage1_vc); + } load_boot_idt(&boot_idt_desc); }diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h index 16b092fd7aa1..cdd328aa42c2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ int efi_get_conf_table(struct boot_params *boot_params, unsigned long *conf_table_pa, unsigned int *conf_table_len, bool *is_efi_64); +
Another stray hunk.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
#else static inline int efi_find_vendor_table(unsigned long conf_table_pa, unsigned int conf_table_len,diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c index 6e8d97c280aa..910bf5cf010e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ #include <asm/fpu/xcr.h> #include <asm/ptrace.h> #include <asm/svm.h> +#include <asm/cpuid.h> +#include <linux/efi.h> +#include <linux/log2.h>
What are those includes for? Polluting the decompressor namespace with kernel proper defines is a real pain to untangle as it is. What do you need those for and can you do it without them?
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
#include "error.h"diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h index 072540dfb129..5f134c172dbf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ struct snp_psc_desc { #define GHCB_TERM_PSC 1 /* Page State Change failure */ #define GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE 2 /* Pvalidate failure */ #define GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0 3 /* SNP guest is not running at VMPL-0 */ +#define GHCB_TERM_CPUID 4 /* CPUID-validation failure */ +#define GHCB_TERM_CPUID_HV 5 /* CPUID failure during hypervisor fallback */ #define GHCB_RESP_CODE(v) ((v) & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK)diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index 534fa1c4c881..c73931548346 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include <linux/types.h> #include <asm/insn.h> #include <asm/sev-common.h> +#include <asm/bootparam.h> #define GHCB_PROTOCOL_MIN 1ULL #define GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX 2ULL@@ -126,6 +127,7 @@ void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, enum psc_op op void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages); void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages); void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void); +void sev_snp_cpuid_init(struct boot_params *bp); #else static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { } static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }@@ -141,6 +143,7 @@ static inline void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, static inline void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages) { } static inline void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages) { } static inline void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void) { } +static inline void sev_snp_cpuid_init(struct boot_params *bp) { } #endif #endifdiff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c index ae4556925485..651980ddbd65 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c@@ -14,6 +14,25 @@ #define has_cpuflag(f) boot_cpu_has(f) #endif +struct sev_snp_cpuid_fn { + u32 eax_in; + u32 ecx_in; + u64 unused; + u64 unused2;
What are those for? Padding? Or are they spec-ed somewhere and left for future use? Seeing how the struct is __packed, they probably are part of a spec definition somewhere. Link pls.
+ u32 eax; + u32 ebx; + u32 ecx; + u32 edx; + u64 reserved;
Ditto. Please prefix all those unused/reserved members with "__".
+} __packed;
+
+struct sev_snp_cpuid_info {
+ u32 count;
+ u32 reserved1;
+ u64 reserved2;Ditto.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+ struct sev_snp_cpuid_fn fn[0]; +} __packed; + /* * Since feature negotiation related variables are set early in the boot * process they must reside in the .data section so as not to be zeroed@@ -26,6 +45,15 @@ static u16 __ro_after_init ghcb_version; /* Bitmap of SEV features supported by the hypervisor */ u64 __ro_after_init sev_hv_features = 0; +/* + * These are also stored in .data section to avoid the need to re-parse + * boot_params and re-determine CPUID memory range when .bss is cleared. + */ +static int sev_snp_cpuid_enabled __section(".data");
That will become part of prot_guest_has() or cc_platform_has() or whatever its name is going to be.
+static unsigned long sev_snp_cpuid_pa __section(".data");
+static unsigned long sev_snp_cpuid_sz __section(".data");
+static const struct sev_snp_cpuid_info *cpuid_info __section(".data");All those: __ro_after_init? Also, just like the ones above have a short comment explaining what they are, add such comments for those too pls and perhaps what they're used for.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+ static bool __init sev_es_check_cpu_features(void) { if (!has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) {@@ -236,6 +264,219 @@ static int sev_cpuid_hv(u32 func, u32 subfunc, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, return 0; } +static bool sev_snp_cpuid_active(void) +{ + return sev_snp_cpuid_enabled; +}
That too will become part of prot_guest_has() or cc_platform_has() or whatever its name is going to be.
+ +static int sev_snp_cpuid_xsave_size(u64 xfeatures_en, u32 base_size, + u32 *xsave_size, bool compacted)
Function name needs a verb. Please audit all your patches.
+{
+ u64 xfeatures_found = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ *xsave_size = base_size;Set that xsave_size only...
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cpuid_info->count; i++) {
+ const struct sev_snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_info->fn[i];
+
+ if (!(fn->eax_in == 0xd && fn->ecx_in > 1 && fn->ecx_in < 64))
+ continue;
+ if (!(xfeatures_en & (1UL << fn->ecx_in)))
+ continue;
+ if (xfeatures_found & (1UL << fn->ecx_in))
+ continue;
+
+ xfeatures_found |= (1UL << fn->ecx_in);For all use BIT_ULL().
+ if (compacted) + *xsave_size += fn->eax; + else + *xsave_size = max(*xsave_size, fn->eax + fn->ebx);
... not here ...
+ } + + /* + * Either the guest set unsupported XCR0/XSS bits, or the corresponding + * entries in the CPUID table were not present. This is not a valid + * state to be in. + */ + if (xfeatures_found != (xfeatures_en & ~3ULL)) + return -EINVAL;
... but here when you're not going to return an error because callers will see that value change temporarily which is not clean. Also, you need to set it once - not during each loop iteration.
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void sev_snp_cpuid_hv(u32 func, u32 subfunc, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx,
+ u32 *ecx, u32 *edx)
+{
+ /*
+ * Currently MSR protocol is sufficient to handle fallback cases, but
+ * should that change make sure we terminate rather than grabbing randomFix the "we"s please. Please audit all your patches.
+ * values. Handling can be added in future to use GHCB-page protocol for + * cases that occur late enough in boot that GHCB page is available
End comment sentences with a fullstop. Please audit all your patches.
+ */
Also, put that comment over the function.
+ if (cpuid_function_is_indexed(func) && subfunc != 0)
In all your patches: s/ != 0//g
+ sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_CPUID_HV); + + if (sev_cpuid_hv(func, 0, eax, ebx, ecx, edx)) + sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_CPUID_HV); +} + +static bool sev_snp_cpuid_find(u32 func, u32 subfunc, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx,
I guess find_validated_cpuid_func() or so to denote where it picks it out from.
+ u32 *ecx, u32 *edx)
+{
+ int i;
+ bool found = false;The tip-tree preferred ordering of variable declarations at the beginning of a function is reverse fir tree order:: struct long_struct_name *descriptive_name; unsigned long foo, bar; unsigned int tmp; int ret; The above is faster to parse than the reverse ordering:: int ret; unsigned int tmp; unsigned long foo, bar; struct long_struct_name *descriptive_name; And even more so than random ordering:: unsigned long foo, bar; int ret; struct long_struct_name *descriptive_name; unsigned int tmp; Audit all your patches pls.
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cpuid_info->count; i++) {
+ const struct sev_snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_info->fn[i];
+
+ if (fn->eax_in != func)
+ continue;
+
+ if (cpuid_function_is_indexed(func) && fn->ecx_in != subfunc)
+ continue;
+
+ *eax = fn->eax;
+ *ebx = fn->ebx;
+ *ecx = fn->ecx;
+ *edx = fn->edx;
+ found = true;
+
+ break;That's just silly. Simply: return true;
+ } + + return found;
return false; here and the "found" variable can go.
+}
+
+static bool sev_snp_cpuid_in_range(u32 func)
+{
+ int i;
+ u32 std_range_min = 0;
+ u32 std_range_max = 0;
+ u32 hyp_range_min = 0x40000000;
+ u32 hyp_range_max = 0;
+ u32 ext_range_min = 0x80000000;
+ u32 ext_range_max = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cpuid_info->count; i++) {
+ const struct sev_snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_info->fn[i];
+
+ if (fn->eax_in == std_range_min)
+ std_range_max = fn->eax;
+ else if (fn->eax_in == hyp_range_min)
+ hyp_range_max = fn->eax;
+ else if (fn->eax_in == ext_range_min)
+ ext_range_max = fn->eax;
+ }So this loop which determines those ranges will run each time sev_snp_cpuid_find() doesn't find @func among the validated CPUID leafs. Why don't you do that determination once at init...
+ + if ((func >= std_range_min && func <= std_range_max) || + (func >= hyp_range_min && func <= hyp_range_max) || + (func >= ext_range_min && func <= ext_range_max))
... so that this function becomes only this check? This is unnecessary work as it is.
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns -EOPNOTSUPP if feature not enabled. Any other return value should be
+ * treated as fatal by caller since we cannot fall back to hypervisor to fetch
+ * the values for security reasons (outside of the specific cases handled here)
+ */
+static int sev_snp_cpuid(u32 func, u32 subfunc, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, u32 *ecx,
+ u32 *edx)
+{
+ if (!sev_snp_cpuid_active())
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (!cpuid_info)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ if (!sev_snp_cpuid_find(func, subfunc, eax, ebx, ecx, edx)) {
+ /*
+ * Some hypervisors will avoid keeping track of CPUID entries
+ * where all values are zero, since they can be handled the
+ * same as out-of-range values (all-zero). In our case, we want
+ * to be able to distinguish between out-of-range entries and
+ * in-range zero entries, since the CPUID table entries are
+ * only a template that may need to be augmented with
+ * additional values for things like CPU-specific information.
+ * So if it's not in the table, but is still in the valid
+ * range, proceed with the fix-ups below. Otherwise, just return
+ * zeros.
+ */
+ *eax = *ebx = *ecx = *edx = 0;
+ if (!sev_snp_cpuid_in_range(func))
+ goto out;That label is not needed.
+ }
All that from here on looks like it should go into a separate function called snp_cpuid_postprocess() where you can do a switch-case on func and have it nice, readable and extensible there, in case more functions get added.
+ if (func == 0x1) {
+ u32 ebx2, edx2;
+
+ sev_snp_cpuid_hv(func, subfunc, NULL, &ebx2, NULL, &edx2);
+ /* initial APIC ID */
+ *ebx = (*ebx & 0x00FFFFFF) | (ebx2 & 0xFF000000);For all hex masks: use GENMASK_ULL.
+ /* APIC enabled bit */
+ *edx = (*edx & ~BIT_ULL(9)) | (edx2 & BIT_ULL(9));
+
+ /* OSXSAVE enabled bit */
+ if (native_read_cr4() & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)
+ *ecx |= BIT_ULL(27);
+ } else if (func == 0x7) {
+ /* OSPKE enabled bit */
+ *ecx &= ~BIT_ULL(4);
+ if (native_read_cr4() & X86_CR4_PKE)
+ *ecx |= BIT_ULL(4);
+ } else if (func == 0xB) {
+ /* extended APIC ID */
+ sev_snp_cpuid_hv(func, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, edx);
+ } else if (func == 0xd && (subfunc == 0x0 || subfunc == 0x1)) {
+ bool compacted = false;
+ u64 xcr0 = 1, xss = 0;
+ u32 xsave_size;
+
+ if (native_read_cr4() & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)
+ xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
+ if (subfunc == 1) {
+ /* boot/compressed doesn't set XSS so 0 is fine there */
+#ifndef __BOOT_COMPRESSED
+ if (*eax & 0x8) /* XSAVES */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))cpu_feature_enabled()
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, xss); +#endif + /* + * The PPR and APM aren't clear on what size should be + * encoded in 0xD:0x1:EBX when compaction is not enabled + * by either XSAVEC or XSAVES since SNP-capable hardware + * has the entries fixed as 1. KVM sets it to 0 in this + * case, but to avoid this becoming an issue it's safer + * to simply treat this as unsupported or SNP guests. + */ + if (!(*eax & 0xA)) /* (XSAVEC|XSAVES) */
Please put side comments over the line they comment.
+ return -EINVAL; + + compacted = true; + } + + if (sev_snp_cpuid_xsave_size(xcr0 | xss, *ebx, &xsave_size, + compacted))
No need for that linebreak.
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *ebx = xsave_size;
+ } else if (func == 0x8000001E) {
+ u32 ebx2, ecx2;
+
+ /* extended APIC ID */
+ sev_snp_cpuid_hv(func, subfunc, eax, &ebx2, &ecx2, NULL);
+ /* compute ID */
+ *ebx = (*ebx & 0xFFFFFFF00) | (ebx2 & 0x000000FF);
+ /* node ID */
+ *ecx = (*ecx & 0xFFFFFFF00) | (ecx2 & 0x000000FF);
+ }
+
+out:
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Boot VC Handler - This is the first VC handler during boot, there is no GHCB
* page yet, so it only supports the MSR based communication with theIs that comment...
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
@@ -244,15 +485,25 @@ static int sev_cpuid_hv(u32 func, u32 subfunc, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code) { unsigned int fn = lower_bits(regs->ax, 32); + unsigned int subfn = lower_bits(regs->cx, 32); u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + int ret; /* Only CPUID is supported via MSR protocol */
... and that still valid?
if (exit_code != SVM_EXIT_CPUID) goto fail; + ret = sev_snp_cpuid(fn, subfn, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + if (ret == 0) + goto out;
I think you mean here "goto cpuid_done;" or so.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+ + if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) + goto fail; + if (sev_cpuid_hv(fn, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx)) goto fail; +out: regs->ax = eax; regs->bx = ebx; regs->cx = ecx;@@ -552,6 +803,19 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs; u32 cr4 = native_read_cr4(); enum es_result ret; + u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + int cpuid_ret; + + cpuid_ret = sev_snp_cpuid(regs->ax, regs->cx, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + if (cpuid_ret == 0) { + regs->ax = eax; + regs->bx = ebx; + regs->cx = ecx; + regs->dx = edx; + return ES_OK; + } + if (cpuid_ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) + return ES_VMM_ERROR;
I don't like this thing slapped inside the function. Pls put it in a separate vc_handle_cpuid_snp() which is called by vc_handle_cpuid() instead.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, regs->ax); ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx);@@ -603,3 +867,113 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_rdtsc(struct ghcb *ghcb, return ES_OK; } + +#ifdef BOOT_COMPRESSED +static struct setup_data *get_cc_setup_data(struct boot_params *bp) +{ + struct setup_data *hdr = (struct setup_data *)bp->hdr.setup_data; + + while (hdr) { + if (hdr->type == SETUP_CC_BLOB) + return hdr; + hdr = (struct setup_data *)hdr->next; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * For boot/compressed kernel: + * + * 1) Search for CC blob in the following order/precedence: + * - via linux boot protocol / setup_data entry + * - via EFI configuration table + * 2) Return a pointer to the CC blob, NULL otherwise. + */ +static struct cc_blob_sev_info *sev_snp_probe_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
snp_find_cc_blob() simply.
+{
+ struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info = NULL;
+ struct setup_data_cc {
+ struct setup_data header;
+ u32 cc_blob_address;
+ } *sd;Define that struct above the function and call it "cc_setup_data" like the rest of the stuff which deals with that.
+ unsigned long conf_table_pa;
+ unsigned int conf_table_len;
+ bool efi_64;
+
+ /* Try to get CC blob via setup_data */
+ sd = (struct setup_data_cc *)get_cc_setup_data(bp);
+ if (sd) {
+ cc_info = (struct cc_blob_sev_info *)(unsigned long)sd->cc_blob_address;
+ goto out_verify;
+ }
+
+ /* CC blob isn't in setup_data, see if it's in the EFI config table */
+ if (!efi_get_conf_table(bp, &conf_table_pa, &conf_table_len, &efi_64))
+ (void)efi_find_vendor_table(conf_table_pa, conf_table_len,
+ EFI_CC_BLOB_GUID, efi_64,
+ (unsigned long *)&cc_info);Yah, check that retval pls with a proper ret variable. No need to cram it all together.
+
+out_verify:
+ /* CC blob should be either valid or not present. Fail otherwise. */
+ if (cc_info && cc_info->magic != CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC)
+ sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
+
+ return cc_info;
+}
+#else
+/*
+ * Probing for CC blob for run-time kernel will be enabled in a subsequent
+ * patch. For now we need to stub this out.
+ */
+static struct cc_blob_sev_info *sev_snp_probe_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Initial set up of CPUID table when running identity-mapped.
+ *
+ * NOTE: Since SEV_SNP feature partly relies on CPUID checks that can't
+ * happen until we access CPUID page, we skip the check and hope the
+ * bootloader is providing sane values.So I don't like the sound of that even one bit. We shouldn't hope anything here...
Current code relies on all CPUID + * page lookups originating from #VC handler, which at least provides + * indication that SEV-ES is enabled. Subsequent init levels will check for + * SEV_SNP feature once available to also take SEV MSR value into account. + */ +void sev_snp_cpuid_init(struct boot_params *bp)
snp_cpuid_init() In general, prefix all SNP-specific variables, structs, functions, etc with "snp_" simply.
+{
+ struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
+
+ if (!bp)
+ sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_CPUID);
+
+ cc_info = sev_snp_probe_cc_blob(bp);
+^ Superfluous newline.
+ if (!cc_info) + return; + + sev_snp_cpuid_pa = cc_info->cpuid_phys; + sev_snp_cpuid_sz = cc_info->cpuid_len;
You can do those assignments ...
+ + /* + * These should always be valid values for SNP, even if guest isn't + * actually configured to use the CPUID table. + */ + if (!sev_snp_cpuid_pa || sev_snp_cpuid_sz < PAGE_SIZE) + sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_CPUID);
... here, after you've verified them.
+ + cpuid_info = (const struct sev_snp_cpuid_info *)sev_snp_cpuid_pa; + + /* + * We should be able to trust the 'count' value in the CPUID table + * area, but ensure it agrees with CC blob value to be safe. + */ + if (sev_snp_cpuid_sz < (sizeof(struct sev_snp_cpuid_info) + + sizeof(struct sev_snp_cpuid_fn) * + cpuid_info->count))
Yah, this is the type of paranoia I'm talking about!
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+ sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_CPUID); + + sev_snp_cpuid_enabled = 1; +}diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c index ddf8ced4a879..d7b6f7420551 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/cpumask.h> +#include <linux/log2.h> +#include <linux/efi.h> #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h>@@ -32,6 +34,8 @@ #include <asm/smp.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> #include <asm/apic.h> +#include <asm/efi.h> +#include <asm/cpuid.h> #include "sev-internal.h"
What are those includes for?
Looks like a leftover...
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette